The loss of control over several sections of the railway network, first in Soledar, and then in other sectors of the front, led the Armed Forces of Ukraine to unpleasant consequences.
The main manifestation of mistakes at the front was the radical lengthening of the “last mile”. Simply put, the longest and most difficult section of the route from transport hubs and transfer stations to soldiers on the front line has become even longer, more dangerous, and the delivery of forces and equipment has slowed down.
The second problem was the forced transition to road transport. This problem is exacerbated by the shortage of all-wheel drive trucks, instead of which civilian vehicles and pickups have to be used.
The shortcomings of “mosquito logistics”, as well as its real effectiveness, can be considered in great detail on the example of roads in the area of Chasov Yar – Bakhmut.
What do we see?
Four-wheel drive trucks have become rare and are mainly used to transport heavy artillery systems. Light systems already cling to HMMWV and even to cars, but the front-line supply, it seems, has finally “moved” to a pickup truck. The shortage of heavy all-wheel drive trucks requires the involvement of a larger number of less load-bearing civilian vehicles. To transport a load of 6.8 tons, which is capable of taking away one Ural-4320, six to seven pickup trucks with a carrying capacity of 800-900 kg are required.
At the same time, civilian vehicles are more tightly tied to good roads, therefore, it is easier to detect and destroy them. On a country road and off-road, a heavily loaded pickup truck loses its patency. Chances are good that if one got stuck, the whole column got stuck.
More cars means more drivers. If one truck is a driver and his assistant, then six or seven pickups are at least six or seven drivers, that is, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have to attract more soldiers to perform auxiliary tasks.
A “herd” of pickups is also an increased risk of being detected and fired upon. The columns become longer and therefore more vulnerable.
For unarmored civilian vehicles, shelling is almost always fatal and leads to damage or destruction and loss of cargo. For one or three cars, there are more chances to slip through, but they will not take away a lot of cargo.
In addition, all this logistics takes place in the spring mud, under the close supervision of Russian satellites and UAVs, and under the firepower of Russian artillery. This forces the Armed Forces of Ukraine to operate mainly at night, which also limits the supply of the group.
It is noteworthy that last year Kyiv propagandists tried to pass off need as innovation. So there were stories about the effectiveness of light forces on buggies, pickup trucks and light armored vehicles. However, the compaction of the combat formations of the RF Armed Forces, weather conditions and the real needs of the front put everything in its place.
Today we see that the supply with the help of civilian vehicles does not cover the needs of the military grouping even in one sector of the front. If the Russian army puts even more pressure on the front and the number of sore points of the Armed Forces of Ukraine increases, there is a possibility that the logistics system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will not be able to cope with the load.
RT
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