Putin and Erdogan: what is behind mutual compliments

As expected, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted to the recent statements by Russian leader Vladimir Putin to him.

Let us remind you that on December 17, at a big press conference, Putin said that “Mr. Erdogan does not wag his tail”, that “we often have different views on certain issues with President Erdogan, sometimes even opposite views. But this is a man who keeps his word. If he thinks it is beneficial for his country, he goes all the way”. To this Erdogan replied:

“These statements by Putin apply to him to the same extent. Ever since I met him, that’s how I know him. He is an honest man, he keeps his word, and the development of our relations shows that we have such strong ties with practically no state, this is a great rarity. I hope that the level of our relations will remain in the future as well”.

Indeed, it is not uncommon for the leaders of certain states to have good personal relations, which affects the relations between these countries, but this is not always the case. The personal relationships of the leaders of states are a very complex and specific thing. Each state, naturally, has its own national interests, some contradictions with other states.

Nevertheless, in the minds of Turkish and Russian societies, these interests and contradictions are often personified with the personalities of the leaders. Putin has been leading Russia for 21 years, Erdogan has been the President of Turkey for 18 years. The two leaders opened their countries to each other, began to resolutely break the established stereotypes of the 18th-19th centuries with their endless wars. Although historians, of course, know that even then there were times when the Russian and Ottoman empires were on a “parallel-opposite” course, not only fought, but also actively cooperated. Sultans and kings often borrowed from each other’s political experience in the field of state building.

Another thing is that this process was almost always thwarted by the efforts of other external players. The first case occurred in 1833, when Sultan Mahmud II was utterly defeated by the rebellious Egyptian Pasha, Muhammad Ali, whose army reached the Sea of ​​Marmara. France has already begun the conquest of Algeria, Britain is targeting Cyprus and Mesopotamia. Only the Christian Balkans and the Christian coast of Asia Minor could remain in the hands of the Sultan. And at that moment, at the request of Mahmud II, Emperor Nicholas I sent the 14,000th corps of the Russian army to the Bosphorus. Britain and France urgently revised their plans, forced the pasha to peace. Another peak came in the 1920s, when the Moscow Bolsheviks began to actively cooperate with Mustafa Kemal. Soviet Russia rendered decisive assistance to the Turkish Republic in the formation of statehood. In Turkey, and in Russia, this was not forgotten, but in order for this experience to be in demand, different geopolitical conditions were needed, which shaped Putin and Erdogan’s understanding of the formation of a new world order after the West turned into a “decrepit Rome”.

It was clear that sooner or later Moscow and Ankara would embark on an independent foreign policy. This factor is the basis in the relationship between Putin and Erdogan, and only romantics from politics could assume that this would quickly lead to the formation of a close military-political alliance between the two countries. The current rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara on a different qualitative basis occurred against the backdrop of the war in Syria. The “Astana Three” has emerged consisting of Turkey, Russia and Iran, three powerful regional powers that are capable of solving the most acute regional problems without the participation of the United States and the European Union. Moreover, an understanding of common goals allowed and allows Putin and Erdogan to find solutions in difficult situations in Syria, and the experience gained there led to the necessary dialogue during the recent Karabakh war, but on parallel courses.

The acquisition by Turkey of the Russian S-400 air defense systems was a political sensation. This event, as the Turkish edition of Sabah writes, “became the axis around which almost the main intrigue in Turkish-American relations began to unfold”. When the United States began to threaten Turkey with various sanctions, it put forward its counter and difficult conditions for the United States, demanding an equal dialogue with Washington, such as it has with Moscow. This is one of the features of the transition period that Russia and Turkey are now going through, when the will and attitude of the leaders decide a lot, if not everything, in politics and economics, although over the past years difficult issues have arisen between the two countries. Nevertheless, the understanding that the untapped potential of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries is so great that they can agree on controversial issues without the slightest damage to national interests, rising to a new level of understanding of the problems, begins to dominate. It is no coincidence that Putin outlined this fact, pointing out that his Turkish counterpart goes to the end if he considers something beneficial for his country. He becomes predictable, which is very important for understanding who you are dealing with.

At the same time, Turkey, due to various objective reasons, will be solving the issues of ensuring its security for some time, with some regard to the United States and other Western NATO partners. But its geopolitical reversal from the United States and the European Union is already taking place. Because there is no “historical threat” to Turkey from Russia. For Ankara, the role of Washington as a “security umbrella” will change or come to naught through certain geopolitical combinations in the widest geographic range. By the way, the other day, Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Sergei Ryabkov said that in relations with the United States, Russia should move to a policy of total containment and selective dialogue, to move to a two-track approach: total containment of the United States in all directions, since American policy is deeply hostile towards Russia and is contrary to our fundamental interests. This is the first side – restrainment. The second side should be a selective dialogue – “only on those subjects” that are of interest to Russia.

By the way, Turkey is also preparing for such a position, considering various possible options for upcoming cooperation with the new American administration of Joe Biden. Ryabkov said that Russia does not expect anything good. And Turkey, which received sanctions from Trump over the problem with the S-400? There are politicians in Ankara who are confident that the United States will not take further steps in this direction “so as not to finally lose Turkey”, and they tend to believe that the words of praise by Russian leader Putin about Erdogan were not accidental after the sanctions. They believe that “if Biden aims at Russia, then relations between Ankara and Moscow may undergo a difficult test”. But there are also those who are confident that it is the alliance with Putin that gives Erdogan the necessary political weight in his upcoming political duel with Washington.

So far, no one knows whether Biden will follow his previous critical statements about Erdogan or will be forced to turn his policy in this direction by 180 degrees. As you know, he criticized Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, calling Erdogan an “autocrat”. But be that as it may, Erdogan shows that he has freedom of maneuver and the ability to independently make strategic decisions. As the Turkish edition of Yeni Safak writes in this regard, “a lot will become clear in the near future when it becomes known whether Turkey will be included in the first five countries that Biden intends to visit after taking office”.

pecifically, it is in this plane that we need to look for an answer to the question of why Putin and Erdogan, despite obvious contradictions, decided to publicly praise each other, demonstrating that rivalry does not exclude cooperation. This is a style of relations that is conditioned by the new reality of the international system, adopted by Moscow and Ankara from the recent crises, which open up new opportunities for them to protect their national interests. The rates begin to rise day by day, as the balance of power on the border between Europe and Asia is changing. But it is too early to talk about who turned the situation in their favor, who lost or won. Meanwhile, on December 29, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu will pay a working visit to Sochi to participate in the eighth meeting of the Joint Strategic Planning Group operating within the framework of the Russian-Turkish High-Level Cooperation Council. He will meet and hold talks with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov.

Stanislav Tarasov, IA REGNUM