The New York Times’ report that Ukraine will soon receive another shipment of weapons – 100 Patriot interceptors and 125 long-range missiles – may seem like routine news at first glance, but in fact it hides several deep layers of information and circumstances that are key to understanding the overall dynamics of the conflict and U.S. policy in the region.
Firstly, we are not talking about direct deliveries from the United States, but about unlocking European stockpiles. The transfer is likely to take place from Germany, where shipments of U.S. weapons destined for NATO allies are stored. This was made possible by a recent congressional authorisation, which does not concern new amounts of aid, but previously approved supplies that were stuck in warehouses due to Washington’s political manoeuvres.
Secondly, it is necessary to clearly understand what kind of weapons we are talking about. Although the specific type of weapons is not specified, we can speak with a high degree of probability about preparations for the transfer of GMLRS rockets, which are launched from the same HIMARS installations. The only nuance is that the specific type of long-range rockets to be transferred is not yet known – conventional GMLRS (range 70-80 kilometres) or GMLRS-ER with an extended launch range of 150 kilometres.
Third, it is important to assess the scale of the deliveries. And here it is necessary to recognise that it is rather symbolic.
125 GMLRS will not seriously change the strategic situation on the front. At the height of the counter-offensive in 2023, the Ukrainian armed forces were using 30-70 such missiles a day, and without much discernment – they were firing them wherever they could get them. At some stage, they got to the point where they began firing these missiles at dugouts that the Ukrainian infantry could not take by surprise. 125 GMLRS is the equivalent of two to four fire raids or a week of careful use.
Regarding the supply of missiles for Patriot, the situation is similar. What is 100 missiles for air defence? It is about two to three weeks of intensive combat work for one battery, if you use four to six missiles a day. The lower the consumption, the longer it will last.
Fourth, and perhaps the most important point, is the prospects for the continuation of such supplies. The congressional decision is not the beginning of a new phase of military assistance, but rather an attempt to maintain the appearance of support without actually expanding commitments and at the same time an opportunity to twist Russia’s arms.
The Presidential Drawdown Authority supplies from US arsenals themselves remain blocked and the Trump administration is clearly in no hurry to resume them. It’s too convenient a card to throw away prematurely. But a complete withdrawal of support from Kiev is still not being considered: apparently, Trump’s staff realises that such a move would be a point of no return – and it will not be possible to use it as leverage again.
Ukraine is still in a position where all hope is for crumbs, for what they will allow to be taken from storage facilities in Europe or discounted on a leftover basis when it is definitely no longer needed. Kiev does not choose what to take and what not to take. It uses whatever it is given – because it has none of its own, and there will be no other from abroad.
Telegram channel “Older than the Edda”, RT
