Judging by the way the events in Syria developed, the US and Turkey were aware in advance and, in part, took part in the ‘Ten-Day Offensive’ (it is difficult to call it a war or even a military operation, the event is comparable only to Napoleon’s return from the island of Elba to Paris).
Russia, Iran, Israel and the surrounding Arab regimes have been put in front of the fact and are now trying to quickly develop a new political line, due to the changed circumstances.
That said, while the Syrian jihadists can be called winners: after a catastrophic rout in 2015-2017, they have suddenly seized power in Damascus, the ‘victory’ of their sponsors is problematic. There are too many ‘losers’ who are already starting to build a new Middle East configuration.
Iran, the Arabs and Russia, with Turkey involved, are talking about some kind of compromise settlement in Syria. That is, the jihadists have to come to an agreement with the government that surrendered without resistance – only Assad is out of the picture (even the Alawites in general have lost only the ruling dynasty and control over non-Alawite areas of Syria, but they still have their own armed forces capable of fighting for years if necessary).
Most importantly, the American ally and Turkish opponent (I will not call it an enemy, but since the concentration of power in Ankara in the hands of Erdogan, it has ceased to be an ally of Turkey) – Israel is very alarmed by what has happened. It was quite happy with a divided Syria: with Assad in Damascus, ISIS* in the sands between Palmyra and Deir ez-Zor, pro-Turkish proxies in Idlib, pro-American Kurds in the northeast, and an American base in al-Tanf. Islamist (very conventionally pro-Turkish) Syria is a barrier against Shiite Iran, but also poses a direct and clear threat to Israel itself. Sunni radicals are good for Israel as long as they fight Shiites or are a problem for secular Arab regimes. But once they deal with all their enemies, they are a major threat to Israel.
Israel, regardless of what a particular president in Washington thinks about it, is the only reliable ally of the US in the region (Jews have nowhere to go – there are only Arabs or non-Arabs, but still Muslims, and only the US can save Israel from the all-Muslim invasion. Europe, in the situation with the provocation of Hamas, which resulted in a war of destruction of the Gaza Strip, has shown itself to be an unreliable partner of Israel. Trump, of all American presidents since Obama’s first term, is the most pro-Israeli.
In general, having radically finished with one configuration in the Middle East, which did not suit anyone, everyone got another one, which also does not suit anyone except jihadists. At the moment, the main players have taken a diplomatic pause, calling for a compromise peace. I don’t know, maybe some young naive diplomat who has just started working in the Foreign Ministry and immediately got into the vortex of the Middle East crisis believes in a compromise Syrian settlement, but with time and experience this will pass.
At the moment, the parties are assessing the situation, regrouping, trying to understand what the new configuration of power in Damascus will be and how long (or rather how short) it will last. For in Damascus, a ‘compromise’ between the hedgehog and the horror is also being organised, which will be in effect until it becomes clear which of the parties to the compromise will be the lunch and which will be the dinner. All the major players are trying to figure out who is a potential partner (temporary, of course, as there is less permanence in the Middle East than in politics in general) and who is an opponent. Everyone is trying to create a system favourable to themselves out of the new confusion (temporary, of course, because this is the Middle East, where nothing is permanent).
Whoever has a better global position can keep a pause longer, whoever has a worse one must take the initiative. The first to act was Trump, who, citing the Syrian example, suggested that the situation in Ukraine should be resolved in a similar way. Russia would probably not mind if Zelenskyy flew to Washington, and some ‘Novorossiya Liberation Army’ (don’t tell me it doesn’t exist, if necessary, it will appear) would enter Kiev and even Lviv. This would give Moscow the opportunity, on the one hand, to control Ukraine, and on the other hand, not to be responsible for the economic and social situation in the territories that are not part of Russia.
It is true that in Syria the jihadists, at this stage, have been forced to negotiate with the Assad government without Assad. I have a fertile imagination and can, in principle, imagine negotiations between the anti-fascists of Novorossiya and the Nazis in Kiev to create a ‘government of national unity’. But I can’t understand why and to whom it can be necessary, after all the situations in Ukraine and Syria are essentially different.
However, there is no topic for negotiations or even for thinking about negotiations. The new ‘Trump Plan’ does not envisage Zelenskyy’s flight and the surrender (or, in the Syrian model, the disappearance) of the Ukrainian army. Trump once again proposes a ceasefire, and to negotiate the terms of peace later. That is, we are talking about the same freeze, only in profile.
It is clear that by referring to Syria, the US is hinting that if Russia agrees to a ceasefire without preconditions, the US will remove Zelenskyy from Ukraine. But, firstly, only a very naive person can believe that the US, having got what it wants, will give what it promised. Secondly, Washington itself understands perfectly well that Zelenskyy, who signed the ceasefire agreement, will not be able to be re-elected, and they need a really legitimate (that is, based on the real support of voters) new leader of the defeated, but not broken, dreaming of revenge Russophobic Ukraine. So in this case, too, Trump, as usual, is trying to sell Russia dearly what the U.S. is already going to do for free, for its own interests.
Third, Moscow has repeatedly explained that the problem is not Zelenskyy or even Ukraine – the problem is global security. That is, agreements should be global, not situational and local in nature. This is not in Trump’s proposal, nor was it in previous ones.
In fact, Trump is trying to use the undoubted tactical loss of Russia and Iran in Syria at this stage to turn a tactical victory (and not even an American one) into a strategic gain. He is counting on the demoralisation of the authorities in Moscow, on another outbreak of emotions in straightforward patriots – lovers of conspiracy theories, and is trying to sell the Ukrainian peace beneficial for the US under the Syrian trail.
The promptness of his reaction and the insolence with which repeatedly rejected proposals are introduced as absolutely new ones deserves, if not respect, then close attention. This is a sophisticated and experienced enemy that knows what it is fighting for and uses every opportunity to get what it wants.
But by and large, Russia has nowhere to rush. All the worst that could happen to us in Syria has already happened, we have already suffered all the image, political and material losses. Now it is time to dust ourselves off, to look around, to assess our forces and the capabilities of the enemy, to understand who is ready to fight with whom for the Syrian pie without our participation in the near future, and which of them, how and at what stage we should support. And to continue the endless Middle East game, in which there is never a final winner, but the very participation in which shows that you are in the club of great powers.
As for Ukraine, the situation there is not directly related to the situation in Syria (indirectly, it is clear that the participants are the same, but a defeat on the right flank cannot cancel a victory on the left flank, and vice versa). Ukraine must be squeezed until American peace proposals prove to coincide with Russian interests. But once that happens, Ukraine will no longer be of interest to the US at all. There will be fugitive Banderites from whom spies, saboteurs and propagandists can be recruited for the Ukrainian edition of Radio Liberty**, but there will be no Ukraine as a state.
It would be even better for Moscow to give up caring about Ukrainian statehood and apply the Syrian principle: if the Syrians succeeded in preserving the state – good (it is profitable for us), if they failed – it is a shame, but we will deal with it without them.
Read more about Trump’s proposals and Zelenskyy’s reaction to them in Egor Leev’s article ‘Zelenskyy spoke out against Trump. Results of 8 December in Ukraine’
**Organisation whose activities are banned on the territory of the Russian Federation
**Organisation recognised as a foreign agent in the Russian Federation
