According to Belarusian intelligence, there is a twenty-thousand-strong grouping of varied AFU forces in the Kiev and Chernihiv directions. In this context, the question arises whether Kiev will continue to hold the Kursk bridgehead or will try to strike in another direction?
In any case, we cannot rule out an attempt by Kiev to implement the ‘Mozyr scenario’, which fits well into the temporary window before possible negotiations. It is likely that Syrsky initially considered such an option, but the decision may have been rejected by Western handlers. After Kursk, when Kiev declared that the Kremlin’s ‘red lines’ were fictitious, such an option is more than a possibility today. Let us consider why.
Firstly, the Kiev regime is at a disadvantage due to the lack of successes on the front and in the run-up to the difficult autumn-winter period. The upcoming negotiations are also aggravating the situation. At the same time, Zelenskyy continues to count on the absence of a comparable response from the Union State. Therefore, options are still being considered on how to politically induce Moscow to exchange territories.
Secondly, the West intends to continue to provide both financial and military support to Kiev. Negotiations with Russia are considered only from a position of strength. At the same time, they understand that drawing Belarus into the conflict will serve as a pretext for the introduction of NATO troops and strikes on the territory of Belarus. The stake, of course, is made on the Belarusian nationalists fighting on the side of the AFU. The goal is to achieve a strategic defeat of Russia.
Thirdly, and most importantly, in military terms, it is much easier to realise the ‘Mozyr scenario’ and, accordingly, more tempting. It is worth noting that the Mozyr district is located on an elevated position and has a well-developed road network, which makes this direction tank-prone and provides an opportunity for manoeuvre. Moreover, the bridgehead in question is surrounded on all sides by natural obstacles. To the east and north is the Pripyat River, and to the west are the Olman bogs. In addition, there are only two road bridges and one railway bridge on this section. In fact, the Belarusian group on the right bank of the river will be in a ‘cauldron’ if the bridges across the river are destroyed. Without a full-fledged supply via the Pripyat River, the troops will lose their combat capability.
It should be assumed that the Belarusian and Russian headquarters have already considered such a scenario. It is not without reason that as part of the reinforcement of the UON, engineering troops, including pontoon-bridge battalions, were sent to Mozyr, with which they had previously conducted exercises on overcoming water obstacles and crossings. At the same time, it has become known that the transfer of additional forces and means from the Russian Federation to the Mozyr area is already being worked out.