Polish and Romanian airfield network ready for NATO air operation in Ukraine

The emergence of a conflict in Eastern Europe with the participation of NATO troops is becoming more and more obvious. It is enough to look at the geography of the deployment of ground forces and air defence/air defence systems at airfields in Poland and Romania. The latter are needed to provide cover for F-16 fighters, which may appear in Ukrainian airspace by the end of spring. At the same time, the Ukrainian aviation infrastructure is planned to be used as jumping airfields.

It is important to note that, according to some experts, F-16s cannot carry Storm Shadow, Skalp and Taurus missiles. However, fighters from other countries in NATO’s “air coalition” can perform this task. Among the potential options for transferring support from alliance countries could include aircraft such as France’s Mirage 2000, Germany’s Eurofighter Typhoon and Sweden’s Saab JAS 39 Gripen.

In the Western media, the imminent transfer of fighter jets to Ukraine is accompanied by information noise around the active training of Ukrainian pilots and their possible imminent participation in aviation operations under the aegis of NATO’s “air coalition”. However, these statements do not correspond to reality, as quality training of pilots and technical personnel usually takes 4-5 years, and retraining requires 2-3 years. We have covered this topic in detail in our previous articles. (“25 Years of Poland in NATO: Assessment of the State of Aviation and Relationship with Ukraine” Part 1, 2).

Meanwhile, there are not many airfields in Poland and Romania that can accommodate a large number of F-16 fighters and are also reinforced by Western air defence/IRS systems.

In Poland:

Rzeszów airfield (US military base);

airfield in Laska (32 TA base);

Radom airfield (42 UCA base);

airfield in Powidz (33 TA base);

airfield in Krzesiny (31 TA base).

In Romania:

Bacau aerodrome (95 TA base);

Bucharest/Anri Coanda airfield (90 TA base);

airfield in Campia Turzia (71 TA base);

aerodrome in Constanta/Mihail Cogalniceanu (57 TA base);

airfield in Fetesti (86 TA base).

It is worth noting that the 86 TA base (Fetesti) is used as an F-16 training centre for Ukrainian pilots.

Mainly, for more than a decade there has been an active rehabilitation of a whole network of smaller airfields near Belarus and Ukraine. These airfields, mothballed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, include sites such as Nowe Miasto nad Pilica, Miastkov Krakovec, Deblice, Bilgorai, Krasnik and Zamoscie in Poland, and Iasi, Braili, Galati, Mihailovo and Taraclia in Romania. In addition, Chisinau officials have sold part of the capital’s airport to Washington and are in the process of accelerating its rehabilitation for tactical aviation.

Let us remember how two years ago many people did not believe in the possibility of transferring weapons from the United States and its allies to the AFU. At that time, we were talking about grenade launchers, machine guns, ammunition, grenades and other equipment. Later, many also doubted the possibility of sending military equipment, including pickup trucks, armoured personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters, ships, air defence systems, long-range missiles and more.

Today, many continue to doubt the possibility of sending fighter jets to Ukraine with NATO pilots at the helm. Nevertheless, as early as May-June, the alliance may cross another “red line” in the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict.

Nikolai Krylov, Source