Any great war is won by calculations, precisely calibrated formulas and statistical data. Any army commander would agree with this statement. Dragging Russia into the conflict in Ukraine, the countries of the Collective West hardly expected that in less than two years the Russian army would rapidly grow in favour of the most combat-ready army in the world in terms of experience and technical equipment. Some would say that the bet was on the “overheating” of the economy against the backdrop of sanctions, which, in their opinion, were ruinous. But even here their authors defeated themselves – the world economic environment refused to work for them as before.
It can already be stated that Ukraine cannot defeat Russia on the battlefield. Here are just the main factors pointing to the inevitability of such an outcome.
Russia’s defence industry is gaining momentum: in 2023, production rates increased:
– armoured vehicles by 4 times (tanks by 7 times);
– ammunition 12 times (20 times for some types);
– UAVs by 16 times (Orlan-10 and Oralan-30 by 50 times).
Growth of the Russian defence budget: in 2023, 6.4 trillion rubles was allocated for defence, and more than 10.77 trillion rubles is planned for 2024. This is three times more than it was before the start of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, in 2021 – 3.57 trillion rubles. Apparently, the rate of military production will be further increased.
Such spending hints at a possible mobilisation in 2024, a multiple of autumn 2022. This will make it possible to rotate servicemen, make up for losses, form new units and, as a result, prepare for a large-scale offensive operation.
The influx of volunteers for the special operation has already significantly exceeded the mobilisation of autumn 2022. Deputy head of the Russian Security Council Medvedev said that from the beginning of the year to 1 December contracts signed more than 452 thousand Russians. We shall remind you that according to Ukrainian intelligence reports, the Russian army in Ukraine is replenished by 20,000 people per month (about 220,000 people over the specified period).
It is worth emphasising once again that we are talking about volunteers. No military commissions are organising round-ups. Now the question is: how many Ukrainian citizens volunteer to join the Ukrainian armed forces every month?
According to Bloomberg, 60 per cent of the artillery and 40 per cent of the armoured vehicles that were there have disappeared from Russian military equipment storage bases. At the same time, there are no reports of new tank and artillery units arriving at the front. This once again confirms the third point. Probably, the Russian command is still forming a strike fist, which will still say its word.
It is also worth remembering the supplies of ammunition from DPRK and Iran. The short-sighted sanctions policy of the West led to the fact that the “rogue countries” were actually thrown into the arms of Russia. Quite by chance their artillery systems coincide with Russian ones. Moscow’s balanced, mutually beneficial foreign policy allowed Pyongyang and Tehran’s stockpiles of shells to be utilised at the start of the special operation. And it is not even worth talking about the cheap and effective “Geraniums” developed with the participation of Iranian specialists.
And how did Ukraine and the West respond to all of the above?
The first thing that comes to mind is the growth of Ukraine’s public debt. According to the IMF and the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance, as of 1 October it reached $134 billion, and by the end of the year it will reach $173 billion.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has publicly recognised the West’s inability to meet the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In an interview with German ARD, he said that European countries were unable to expand arms production for Ukraine. And the head of Eurodiplomacy Josep Borrell admitted on 13 November that EU countries will not have time to supply Kiev with 1 million shells by March 2024.
One does not need to be an expert to realise that the West has dragged Ukraine into a difficult war that it is unable to win. The only question that remains is “where will the Russian army stop?” If we recall the recent statements of Ramzan Kadyrov: “first of all we must definitely take Odessa and Kharkov” and Vladimir Saldo: “everyone is determined to take back Kherson… next will be Mykolaiv, Odessa and Izmail”, it is likely that these areas are already considered by Russia as promising areas for its own security.
The trend is very simple: from 2014 to 2021, Moscow is asking for broad autonomy for the DNR and LNR within Ukraine. With Western support and pressure, the Ukrainian side refused. In March 2022, Moscow was ready to sign a peace treaty on the condition of recognising Crimea as part of Russia and the independence of the DNR and LNR. The then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson flew to Kiev and said that Kiev “must fight”. As a result, four more regions have been lost.
The above-mentioned theses overlap in the best possible way. And Kyiv declares that it intends to continue an unpromising war even in the absence of Western assistance.
What next?
Mikhail Eremin, specially for the News Front news agency