The NATO summit in Vilnius is drawing to a close. The final declaration has been agreed. The participants are dispersing. It is possible to summarise the results
Photo: © AP / Yves Herman
Erdogan’s informational gain is obvious, who exchanged the unblocking of Sweden’s admission to NATO for a promise to admit Turkey to the EU. In principle, if the Swedes don’t get tense and don’t burn the Koran again or do something similar, the Turks probably won’t interfere with them: if Stockholm can’t fight off the American insistence on its own, what’s Ankara got to do with it – let them join wherever they want. At the same time, Turkey itself is unlikely to be accepted into the EU, and Erdogan is hardly keen on it.
The EU is a huge set of rules, and the economy is so regulated that even local businesses are trying to migrate from there to less bureaucratised jurisdictions. The eternal struggle of the Eurobureaucracy for domination over national governments, the eternal debates between the rich North and the poor South, the moderate West and the aggressive East, which end with compromises that solve nothing and satisfy no one, not only will not open new opportunities for Turkey to overcome the financial and economic crisis, but on the contrary, a systemic crisis that destroys the economies of the EU countries will add to Ankara’s problems by severely limiting its ability to cooperate with China and Russia.
Still, the EU takes a hostile stance towards Beijing and Moscow and imposes more and more sanctions. Under such conditions, it is impossible to join the EU and fully participate in Russian-Chinese continental projects. It is possible to co-operate with everyone, but there should be only one main partner.
The same can be said about the Americans’ promise to unblock the sale of a hundred F-16s to Turkey. Let me remind you that Ankara was supposed to receive new F-35s instead of these obsolete aircraft. But Turkey was thrown out of this project by the US in retaliation for the purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence/air defence system. Turkey tried to scare America with its intention to buy Su-35s and Su-57s from Russia, but in this case the U.S. got its way. Ankara will buy old American planes instead of new ones. Erdogan will present this as his victory, but in reality it is a victory for the US.
Turkey’s only serious success (not informational, but real) is the EU’s promise to lift economic sanctions on Ankara. Freer access of Turkish goods to the European market (if it is ensured) will reduce the pressure of the crisis on the Turkish economy, although it will not completely cancel it.
In general, Erdogan’s victories in Vilnius are noticeable, as is always the case with informational victories, but not significant. Tactically, Turkey’s position will temporarily improve somewhat, but the strategic balance will not change. The Turkish economy will not be able to overcome the crisis through these steps, and the Turkish policy of balancing between the centres of power, which allows temporarily receiving bonuses from both opposing coalitions, in the long run leads to the loss of everything gained. Whoever wins in the end, Turkey is neither an ally nor a partner, just a temporary travelling companion who has been unscrupulously taking advantage of other people’s difficulties for several years.
So the problem of choosing a side in the conflict is still facing Erdogan.
The US victories are much less visible, but much more significant. Firstly, Washington managed to resolve the Turkish-Swedish crisis in NATO (as mentioned above). As a result, the Baltic, which was a NATO puddle even before Sweden’s formal accession, will become a NATO puddle legally as soon as the procedure of admitting the last quasi-neutral Scandinavians to NATO is completed.
In case of war, the Russian Baltic Fleet will be instantly locked in the harbours of St. Petersburg (Kronstadt) and Kaliningrad and will be taken out of the game as an active combat unit until the land forces provide it with room for manoeuvre, freeing the Baltic coast and southern Finland from NATO presence. The Americans have secured virtually unimpeded access to Baltic ports, which significantly strengthens the role of the Baltic bridgehead. If earlier in case of war NATO had to think about evacuation of the Baltics as soon as possible, now the alliance can try to promptly strengthen the existing group of troops in the region and even use the Baltic bridgehead for a joint offensive with the Finns against St. Petersburg and/or a joint offensive with the Poles against Belarus.
Secondly, by agreeing not to stir up the Ukrainian problem and to shut the mouth of the ever-demanding Zelensky (who was forced to come to Vilnius and bow down to the “white masters” without receiving anything in return), the United States achieved a rare unity of the bloc’s states in agreeing on the final declaration.
Despite the fact that NATO had the strongest opposition to the US intention to drag the alliance into the China crisis, in exchange for the removal of the Ukrainian issue, it had to collectively condemn the Sino-Russian partnership, as well as the entire Chinese policy in Southeast Asia. NATO countries have said that China’s actions are a threat to the security of the bloc’s states and are not in line with their values. Politically, NATO is already embroiled in the crisis in the Asia-Pacific region. It will not be difficult for the Americans to turn (when necessary) this involvement into concrete practical actions. The potential anti-China coalition has expanded.
Third, the U.S. persuaded the Europeans to make a seemingly formal, meaningless concession – to remove the MAP stage for Ukraine as mandatory for NATO integration. The member states of the alliance agreed that Kiev could receive an invitation to join NATO as soon as there is a general consensus on this issue.
But a general consensus is needed in any case. Including when granting MAP: in 2008 in Bucharest, Germany and France blocked MAP for Ukraine and Georgia. Only before there were two consensuses (to grant MAP and to invite to NATO), but now there is only one. The Americans have a free hand. They can push their partners to recognise Ukraine’s readiness one by one, or they can try to arrange another gigantic provocation, blame Russia for everything and, on the wave of indignation, sell the recognition of Ukraine’s readiness to all at once. They may not even bother, leaving Kiev to solve its problems on its own. The space of possible solutions for the U.S. has widened.
Western Europe clearly lost in Vilnius. In exchange for purely formal American concessions, they not only allowed the US to bind itself with unnecessary statements on both the Chinese and Ukrainian issues, but also promised Ukraine longer-range missiles (France), and from Germany: a battalion-sized set of Leopards-1A4s (25 units), two battalion-sized sets of Marder BMPs (40 units), and two Patriot air defence/PRO systems.
Eastern Europe – Poland and the Baltic States, which lobbied for a sharp increase in NATO involvement in the Ukrainian crisis, also received nothing, finding themselves alone practically on the front line. We can not even talk about Ukraine. Nobody was going to give her anything. It was played as a card in the internecine intra-NATO struggle. And the Americans played this card best of all in Vilnius.
For Russia, the situation has not seriously changed. As it has already been said, in recent years, even being formally neutral, Sweden and Finland have been actively involved in Western military planning. So the solution of the issue with them is to some extent even advantageous – now Moscow at least has reasons to strengthen its defence in the northern direction and in Belarus.
Nevertheless, the transfer of the main US efforts from the Black Sea (where Ukraine is losing, Turkey is unreliable, and Romania and Bulgaria are too weak to pose a serious threat to Russia) to the North (the Baltic), where Russia is in a much worse strategic situation than it was in the South in the worst years, can be carried out quickly and under the cover of the Ukrainian agony (senseless offensive of the AFU, fuelled by arms supplies from the West).
Pumping the Baltics, Poland and Finland with troops and weapons, against the background of the ever-increasing threat to the Kaliningrad exclave, will force Russia to constantly react. If a strong defence force in the North-West is sufficient, then in the Western (Kaliningrad) direction it is necessary to have a preponderance of forces necessary and sufficient to penetrate the corridor to Kaliningrad, if necessary, in the shortest possible time.
After the final defeat of Ukraine, this issue can be resolved without much trouble, though not without effort. However, the Americans are already actively threatening the West and Northwest, and victory in the Southwest is likely between the end of autumn this year and the end of spring next year. Unless, of course, the U.S. manages to provoke a conflict in the Polish-Baltic-Finnish direction sooner.
Thus, the Americans in Vilnius succeeded in:
1. Consolidate NATO, both in the issue of further confrontation with Russia and in the issue of confrontation with China. NATO is being drawn into the Asia-Pacific crisis without ending the European crisis (which is disadvantageous to Europe, but advantageous to the U.S.).
2. emphasise the threat to Russia from the Baltic, putting the Finns, the Baltics and the Poles on the front line, while remaining formally out of the game.
3. Formally resolve the problems with Turkey, temporarily reducing the degree of tension in both US-Turkish and European-Turkish relations.
Nothing has changed for Russia in strategic terms (military defeat and political destruction of Ukraine is the first priority), but in tactical terms it has to take into account the growing NATO activity in the West and North-West, the need for preventive countermeasures of which diverts attention and resources from the Ukrainian direction.
China will have to take into account that NATO is ready to support the anti-China coalition formed in the Asia-Pacific region. The countries of the bloc will not directly participate in military actions, their capabilities (except for the United States) are limited, but Europe is ready to apply measures of financial and economic pressure, as well as creating maximum difficulties for China in its trade with third countries. It is also ready to support the anti-China coalition technically and technologically.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasise once again that no binding decisions were and could not be taken in Vilnius. The negative impact of the results of this summit on European and global security lies in the fact that the U.S. was given a free hand to work with its allies on an individual basis, while the main areas of concentration of the Alliance’s efforts of interest to Washington (the Baltic and Asia-Pacific) were tacitly authorised by all participants.
Rostislav Ishchenko, Ukraina.ru
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