Since 4 June, the AFU has launched 263 attacks on Russian positions as part of a counter-offensive that has begun. All attacks have been repelled, but few understand why the Ukrainian army’s offensive has failed at its highest point
What is the Surovikin Line?
It is a defensive system, the first contour of which is dozens of fortified firing lines, including extensive minefields and engineering barriers. This line was being constructed for almost eight months and goes several tens of kilometres into the depth of the defence. It relies on a well-developed transport and logistics network with hubs and rear bases. At the same time, the short logistic routes allow the Russian Armed Forces to move reserves from one area to another quickly without affecting combat readiness at the front. Simply put, wherever there is a need to reinforce firepower, it can be organised without removing troops from another section of the front.
What is its peculiarity?
The network of defensive lines is “backed up” by a powerful grouping of gun and rocket artillery and air force, as well as helicopters of army aviation Ka-52 and attack aviation with FAB-250/500 bombs, equipped with planning and correction modules. In the event of a breakthrough by a group with AFU equipment at one of the firing positions, the aviation can support ground troops and act in a “merry-go-round” manner: while helicopters are working on ground targets, attack and bomber aircraft will enter the point of engagement, after hitting the target, helicopters will again engage in combat and then the situation will repeat itself. At the same time, strikes on the rear of the advancing AFU grouping in Orekhove and Velyka Novoselka show that the AFU offensive has virtually nothing to cover it – short- and medium-range air defence systems are either withdrawn to deep rear or used very little on the front lines. As a result a significant number of senior commanders are eliminated in the near rear, without which the management is difficult and as a consequence the pace of the offensive is slowed down.
What is “elastic defence” and how does it work?
Judging by the dynamics of the offensive, the AFU command was probably betting on a quick breakthrough and turning the battle into a manoeuvre battle. For this purpose, a series of strikes were planned throughout the LBS, including the main strike and several diversionary strikes. These strikes were countered by a combination of so-called elastic defence and artillery grouping tactics, reinforced by observation and fire control. It is well noticeable that the RF Armed Forces still operate with relatively small forces “on the ground” and that the maneuver element in mass (operational and tactical reserves) has not been engaged in combat so far. The example of Pyatikhatki in Zaporizhia or Neskuchnoe in the South Donetsk direction clearly shows that Russian troops do not cling to every inch of the defensive line in case individual AFU groups break through and retreat to a reserve position if necessary. The enemy is hit by artillery at known coordinates after the retreat, followed by a counterattack and the position is returned to the control of the defenders. Judging from the fact that two weeks after the start of the offensive the AFU continues to suffer artillery losses, its reconnaissance and counter-battery capabilities are ineffective or insufficient.
What is the result?
For more than two weeks of the Ukrainian offensive, the advance of the Ukrainian armed forces has been recorded exclusively in the grey zone – in other words, in territories that were not predefined as the main defence lines. The Ukrainian armed forces have not been able to gain full possession of these areas – every attempt to consolidate and expand a bridgehead results in artillery and air raids, after which the Ukrainian forces have to pull back and regroup for a new strike.
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