It would be wrong to call Ukraine a country of paradoxes, since it is a country-paradox itself. One big paradox since its appearance on the political map
Even before the declaration of independence, the Ukrainian elites showed a clear intention to orient their future “sovereign” policy towards the West. At the same time, the West, whose leadership at that time was much more adequate than the current one, was by no means in a hurry to rejoice at the acquisition of a new “ally”.
No less clear than the desire to become part of the West, another desire of Ukraine was manifested – to confront Russia. “Gas wars” due to the shameless theft of gas, scandals around the division of the Black Sea Fleet, a destructive position on the issue of dividing Soviet debts and property abroad, sabotage within the CIS, which did not allow the Commonwealth to turn into an effective integration mechanism, as well as the creeping Ukrainization of everything that moves began back in 1992. At the same time, the officers of the Soviet Army, who took the Ukrainian oath, were asked the question invented by the head of the socio-psychological department of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, now deceased General Mulyava: “Are you ready to fight with Russia?”
In the early years of Ukrainian independence, the West, on its honeymoon with Yeltsin’s Russia making unprecedented geopolitical concessions, in most Russian-Ukrainian disputes tended to either take a truly neutral position or indirectly support Moscow. De facto, the United States and the EU recognized that Ukraine was part of the Russian sphere of exclusive interests, and in the 1990s did not give Kyiv the advances that the Balts and Eastern European states received, whose future admission to the EU and NATO was determined almost immediately, even though the ground for the first (after the Cold War, in total the fourth) expansion have been preparing for almost a decade.
The Americans realistically believed that Russia’s attempts to establish constructive cooperation with the initially Russophobic Ukrainian and other post-Soviet regimes would only weaken Russia, since it would require significant resource costs without any return. In fact, the Americans handed over the post-Soviet underground, disloyal to Russia, to the Kremlin for the sake of free hands in Eastern Europe. And in this matter, they were right: while Russia was busy with the integration of Ukraine into common structures with Belarus and Kazakhstan, the Americans were able to fully integrate Eastern Europe into NATO and the EU.v
But then the question arose before them: how to further dismantle Russia for spare parts? Moscow, too, did not sit idly by. For fifteen difficult years, it stabilized the internal political situation, suppressing the centers of separatism and consolidating the elites, reached an internal political consensus, avoiding the danger of a civil conflict that was looming close by the end of the 90s, proceeded to restore the economy and replenish the budget, partially restored the combat capability of the Armed Forces and began further military reform, as a result of which by 2020 the Russian army has reached a stable second, and in a number of strategic indicators (the percentage of new weapons in the Strategic Missile Forces) and first place in the world.
Russia became strong enough to demonstrate its intention to use armed force to protect its interests in the post-Soviet space already in 2008 (Georgia) and in any region of the planet in 2015 (Syria). The West has lost hope of winning a conventional war against Russia without the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as the opportunity to carry out its armed interventions in any region of the planet without resistance. Russia also could not defeat the West, but it was enough that it had enough forces to prevent the West from defeating its allies. At that moment, the unipolar world collapsed. For if a hegemon is not a hegemon at least in some way, then he is not a hegemon in everything. Hegemony can only be absolute, or it does not exist.
Ukraine has become the main mechanism through which the United States tried to regain hegemony. It has been and is drawing on Russian resources, giving the United States time and space for political maneuver, and causing Russia direct harm. Another thing is that both on the battlefield, and in the economy, and in all other respects, Ukraine loses orders of magnitude more than Russia. But this is not an American problem.
For the United States, it is important that their costs of a proxy war with Russia be less than Moscow’s losses from this war. That is why they do not care not only what will happen to Ukraine, but also what will happen to Europe, whose deindustrialization (which, like in Ukraine, will be followed by depopulation) they are now actively engaged in, while simultaneously trying to force at least part of their European allies to replace the dying Ukraine on the hot front line with Russia.
The US hope is as simple as the world. They operate according to a scheme repeatedly applied by the British to their strong continental opponents. It is necessary to force the enemy to wage an endless war in Europe, hiring more and more powers against them for subsidies. In the end, it will overstrain (even get tired of success), its economy will not withstand the stress of war, society will get tired of bearing losses, the opposition will undermine the domestic political situation, and once formidable enemy will collapse (as, for example, Napoleon I collapsed). The United States proceeds from the fact that if Russia is forced to fight for a decade with new and new enemies, then Russian society will not withstand the psychological pressure, the economy, increasingly tied to the provision of hostilities, will begin to falter, and ultimately Moscow will not withstand internal problems and the United States will regain hegemony.
Ukrainians naively expect that they will be appointed as occupiers of the defeated Russia, and then they will finally win back everything. But such a move is not foreseen at all. Khodorkovsky has a much better chance than Zelensky of getting an American label for Gauleitism. After all, the United States needs to establish control over Russian resources and organize their exploitation for its own purposes, and what can Kyiv beggars organize, except for a gang to steal grants and loans. In this regard, the Russian liberal emigration, which already worked in the 90s as pro-American compradores in what was then Russia, will give their Ukrainian colleagues a hundred points ahead and still win. That is why Kyiv does not like “good Russians”. They win the “warring nation” competition for the master’s affection.
In general, not only Europeans, but also Americans are well aware that Ukraine will not win this war – Ukrainians will end much earlier than Russia will feel the first problems. Ukraine is just one of many countries that, according to Washington’s plan, must crash into Russia in order for Moscow to finally get hurt.
But let’s imagine the impossible: the Americans have won, regained their hegemon status, and Ukraine is still breathing. Where do you think Western investments will go – in the development of the bottomless Russian resource pantry or in the restoration of useless Ukrainian cities and the payment of pensions to hundreds of thousands of surviving disabled Ukrainians. Will the US and EU pour money into the corrupt Ukrainian regime after it is no longer needed?
To be honest, I don’t even believe that the promised Crimea and Donbass will be returned to Kyiv: Americans are diligent hosts and do not scatter good things. From the point of view of economic development, it is much easier to give Eastern Ukraine to the “good Russians” and Western Ukraine to the Poles. Together they will deal with the impudent Bandera, and the American masters will be served not out of fear, but out of conscience, because they will take their places only by the will of the hegemon.
So Ukraine has made that unique geopolitical choice, when, no matter how the current geopolitical confrontation ends, its continued existence (after the war) is not foreseen. Only Russia was interested in the existence of a friendly and strong Ukraine. Such a Ukraine would serve as a buffer separating the US and NATO from native Russian territories, and could also be an effective economic partner. But now, when the Ukrainian economy is destroyed, and the population has fled or is infected with Russophobia, Ukraine and Russia do not need it.
We don’t know exactly how Ukraine will live the rest of its days and on what date the international community will be forced to certify its death due to a clear inability to live, we don’t know if the dividing lines will pass through its territory and if they pass, then where exactly, but we are sure we know that in the coming years Ukraine must disappear, because its existence becomes a burden for everyone, regardless of the development of events.
One could say that this is a villainous fate, but no – this is the free choice of a free people and this choice must be respected: she died like that.
Rostislav Ishchenko, Ukraine.ru
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