2022 has become, perhaps, the most difficult year for Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet space since the collapse of the Soviet Union. If only because Moscow had to conduct a full-fledged military operation on the territory of one of the largest states in the region. However, 2023 will not become easier – rather, on the contrary
And not only because, in the words of Zelensky, it will be decisive in terms of the situation on the territory of Ukraine. Those tendencies that took shape in previous years and were catalyzed after the start of the Russian special operation will fully straighten their shoulders in the coming year. Russia is facing a full-fledged crisis in the post-Soviet space – but this same crisis may well become the darkest hour of the night, after which the dawn will begin. Simply put, on the ruins of the Soviet Union, a new, more efficient structure may begin to line up.
For example, in 2023, frozen, frozen and simply unresolved conflicts are expected to escalate throughout the region. In Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, on the borders between the Central Asian states, it will be quiet only in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgians pragmatically set their teeth on their wise position of neutrality and all attempts by Ukraine to move them lead to nothing). Three groups of players will aggravate the conflicts. Moreover, the cooperation of various groups among themselves is by no means excluded.
First, the United States and its Western allies. Against the backdrop of the concentration of Russian resources on the Ukrainian conflict, they will try to create new points of tension for Russia in order to draw off its resources, both diplomatic and military.
Secondly, regional actors will also promote their agenda, seeing in the current situation a rare window of opportunity to strengthen their positions in the post-Soviet space. And if, let’s say, China can do it quietly and without problems for Moscow (it, like Russia, needs peace and quiet in the same Central Asia), then Turkey is strengthening due to the aggravation of its proxies in the Caucasus, as well as due to the spread of pan-Turkist and Islamist ideas in the Central Asian region.
Finally, thirdly, the regional states themselves will straighten their shoulders. They can take advantage of the weakening of Russian attention in order to either settle scores among themselves (win border disputes), or increase the intensity of the gap “with the damned imperial past” (as is done in some Central Asian republics that have stepped up the fight against the Russian language), or give up more expensively lease it to the West (publicly expressing readiness to comply with Western sanctions), or blackmail Russia by willingness to lease it.
Short-sighted and dangerous, but logical
If the attempts of global and regional players to catch a fish in troubled waters seem logical, then the actions of the post-Soviet powers do not. They may bring some tactical benefits (and even then only if Moscow does not consider that the actions of the players cross the red lines – for example, if Moldova, with the help of the Romanian military dressed in Moldovan uniforms, decides to occupy Transnistria), but in a strategic plan are losing. Moreover, regardless of the outcome of the Russian-Western conflict in Ukraine.
If Moscow wins this conflict, it will settle scores with those who poked daggers in its back. If Moscow brings the conflict to a draw, then it will not only settle scores, but will win back. However, this policy is a logical consequence of Russian behavior in the post-Soviet space over the past 30 years. It always happens when you give a lot, but demand little in return. Russia gave security, its own market (including labor), development prospects – but did not demand from its former territories either real loyalty or assistance in solving global problems (in the same Syria, only Armenia came to the aid of Moscow, and even then not a lot and not all at once). Not even respect for the cultural and human heritage that has remained in these territories since their stay in Greater Russia.
Instead of being grateful for the system of education, healthcare, transport, and so on created under Russia, the authorities of the post-Soviet countries maintained “museums of occupation”, limited the spread of the Russian language, and interfered with the attempts of Russian institutions to promote “soft power”. In fact, Russian softness and human nature have led to the fact that instead of a feeling of gratitude, a number of our allies have a feeling of permissiveness, which has transformed into the opinion that they owe Russia nothing.
Moscow will reap the consequences of such a policy in 2023 – and the only question is how large these consequences will be. However, on the other hand, the very occurrence of these consequences is not only a problem, but also an opportunity to realize the need to develop a new political line. Despite the fact that after our victory all allies stand in line with congratulations, it is necessary to fundamentally pragmatize relations within the framework of the CSTO and the Eurasian Union.
To convince our neighbors of the need to respect Russian interests – both in terms of economics and culture, and in terms of foreign policy. Explain to them that Russian assistance is not charity, but a Russian investment in order to receive profitable dividends for Russia. To make it clear (perhaps even with a specific example) that anti-Russian actions, especially in the interests of Western players, will lead to the deprivation of neighbors of benefits – from unhindered access to the Russian market, ending with their withdrawal from the Russian defense perimeter. And, finally, seriously engage in the formation of Russian institutions of soft power – and even something in this regard (or rather, a lot of things) to learn from the masters of this business from London and Washington.
Of course, you can do none of this. You can again give resources in exchange for assurances of friendship. However, in this case, Moscow will not only get a continuation of ingratitude – it will push its neighbors along the Ukrainian path. If you do not participate in the cultivation of local elites, if you do not build pragmatic relations, if you do not stop Russophobia, if you do not teach self-respect, then Russia will receive other anti-Russias on its borders. And one was enough for us.
Gevorg Mirzayan, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, VIEW
Due to censorship and blocking of all media and alternative views, stay tuned to our Telegram channel