It has become fashionable these days to draw parallels between the current state of US-Russian relations and the famous Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Moreover, we are very close to the 60th anniversary of the latter: the decision of John Kennedy administration to impose blockade against Cuba was made at the White House on the evening of October 20, after which the crisis assumed its acute phase
Despite the obvious similarity of the two episodes of military-political confrontation between Moscow and Washington, there are several fundamental differences between them that clearly illustrate the unprecedented danger of the current situation – even compared to the dramatic events of the early 1960s. Let us list some of them.
First. The Cuban crisis was brief – less than two weeks passed from the decision to blockade Cuba to the beginning of dismantling Soviet R-12 missiles on the island. The current crisis has now dragged on for seven and a half months, having long since become part of the ‘new geopolitical daily life’. And we still don’t seem to have reached its lowest point.
Second. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a “clean” nuclear crisis. In fact, the dispute between the two superpowers was over one specific issue – the withdrawal by the Soviet Union of P-12 missiles from Cuba in exchange for the US abandoning its attempts to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime. An additional condition Moscow insisted on was the withdrawal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkish territory. The current crisis is not limited to the nuclear sphere; it is exacerbated by the fact that the US has long been indirectly involved in a large-scale military conflict with Russia on the European continent, providing comprehensive military, technical, intelligence, economic and other support to Ukraine.
Third. For both sides, the stakes in the current crisis are higher than they were 60 years ago. Cuba, of course, was of great symbolic and practical importance to both the United States and the Soviet Union, but the fate of Ukraine is still more important to both the Kremlin and the White House. A clear defeat for Moscow would jeopardize not only the fate of the current Russian leadership, but also the future of Russian statehood as such. A U.S. defeat could trigger the collapse of NATO, put an end to efforts to restore America’s undermined leadership in world politics and guarantee a change of power in the presidential election of 2024.
Fourth. The structure of the nuclear missile arsenals that Moscow and Washington possess today is fundamentally different from anything they had at their disposal in 1962. For example, in the early 1960s there were no modern high-precision systems, small and ultra-small nuclear warheads were still in the development stage. Accordingly, the line between nuclear and conventional warfare was very clearly drawn. Today the line is much less clear and there are occasional discussions on both sides of the conflict about the “permissibility” of a limited nuclear conflict.
Fifth. Sixty years ago, the level of mutual respect and even mutual trust between the leaders in Moscow and Washington was much higher than it is today. In the fateful days of October 1962, the two leaders assumed that the agreements reached would be respected one way or another. Today, neither the Kremlin nor the White House is so confident. Moreover, both sides of the conflict seem to be fully convinced that the enemy is in a state of deep and irreversible decline, and therefore any strategic agreements with it make little sense.
Sixth. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the lines of communication remained open, with the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatolii Dobrynin, meeting repeatedly with Robert Kennedy, and continuing personal contacts with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Russian Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Antonov can only dream of such access to top US officials. And the new US ambassador to Russia, Lynn Tracy, has not yet reached Moscow at all, and it is not even known when she will finally show up at the Spaso House.
Seventh. Both the protagonists of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy, personally experienced all the horrors and hardships of World War II, fighting it from beginning to end in Europe (Khrushchev) and the Pacific (Kennedy). Vladimir Putin and Joseph Biden belong to the post-war generation. Although born in 1942, President Biden barely remembers anything about the war years and it is unlikely that the 46th president of the US can imagine the consequences of the new world conflict as vividly as the 35th president of the White House.
For all the differences between the two situations, however, the words of John F. Kennedy at American University on June 10, 1963, six months after the two superpowers had succeeded in retreating from the edge of the nuclear abyss, are still quite relevant: “The most important thing is that, in defending their vital interests, the nuclear powers should not allow a format of confrontation that puts the enemy before a choice between humiliating retreat and nuclear war. To choose such a format in the nuclear age would be evidence of the utter bankruptcy of our politics, or a manifestation of the collective unconscious desire for the destruction of the entire world.
Perhaps there is no better way to put it.
RIAC Director General Andrei Kortunov, Izvestia