The beginning of the year 2021 has already defined a common negative tone in relations between Russia and the European Union
The February visit to Moscow by European diplomatic chief Josep Borrell ended in a fierce, far from diplomatic, duel between him and Sergey Lavrov. The Europeans were outraged by the verdict against Navalny and the “lack of democracy” in Russia. They rebuked us for meddling in domestic affairs and our unwillingness to take Russia’s interests into account. In fact, the dialogue between Russia and the EU was interrupted before it had even begun.
“The long-awaited completion of Nord Stream 2, which was delayed for more than two years, could be considered a “honey in the ointment”. However, the pipeline could not be commissioned even though Europe had a huge need for more or less inexpensive gas. The year was crowned by the Russian draft treaty with NATO, which caused more than a cool reaction in Europe. No light was in sight, not even close. In 2022 even the absence of any anti-Russian lunge on the part of the EU can be considered as a positive event.
At the level of relations with individual states, several unpleasant events also took place. Perhaps the most striking was the almost total break with the Czech Republic. The spy scandal and attempts to blame Russia for the 2014 landfill bombings had already brought relations almost to a freezing point. It was because of the Czech behaviour that Russia came up with the very notion of a “List of Unfriendly Countries”. And the coming to power of a government dominated by outspoken Russophobes has forced a temporary end to Russian-Czech political ties.
In neighbouring Slovakia things were not so tough, but still unpleasant. Prime Minister Igor Matovic’s desire to buy the Russian vaccine Sputnik V was resisted by the most “Euro-Atlantic” part of the government and led to his resignation. The result was the Slovak authorities’ refusal to continue using Sputnik. Another thing is that this story undermined the position of the government and strengthened the more Russia-friendly opposition. The country may face early parliamentary elections in 2022.
The outcome of elections in the Netherlands, where Prime Minister Mark Rutte has retained power, has not added to our optimism. Relations with that country have also almost reached the bottom in view of the Dutch persistent attempt to pin the blame for the Boeing crash over Donbass on Russia. The most unpleasant thing here is that with the departure of Angela Merkel, Rutte, who has been in power for 11 years, has actually become the most experienced and authoritative politician in the EU, influencing his line very substantially. There is no reason for optimism for us in 2022 in the case of the Netherlands either.
Things have not turned out so badly for Germany, where the Merkel era is over. But the arrival of the coalition “Traffic Light” due to the anti-Russian “greens” and free democrats does not bode well for us. The new chancellor, Olaf Scholz, can at best contain the most radical proposals of the “junior” partners. The possibility of blocking Nord Stream 2 because of Russia’s “bad” behaviour instead of rejecting it, as the Germans eventually decided, is not the worst option, but it is only a question of maintaining relations. No more than that.
There were also some unpleasant signals from Denmark in 2021. During the European Football Championship, Denmark did not allow Russian fans in. After years of hesitation, the northerners still gave the go-ahead for Nord Stream 2, but made it clear that they were ready to reconsider their decision because of the Navalny case or Ukraine. As a result the Danish direction can turn into trouble in 2022 too – the more so because Russian-Danish relations are already not far from freezing point.
Conflicting news came in 2021 from Bulgaria. On the one hand 12 years of prime-minister Boyko Borisov’s era which was not once marked by anti-Russian actions came to an end there. President Rumen Radev, loyal to us, retained his post as president. But Borisov was succeeded in government by Kirill Petkov, leader of the party “Continuing Change”, who has clearly identified the Euro-Atlantic vector as the main one. Thus in 2022 there will clearly be two centres of power in Bulgaria – with the anti-Russian one in the form of the Cabinet of Ministers predominating.
The only country where the government has changed to one that is more favourable to Russia is Norway. The incoming cabinet of Jonas Gahr Støre has already signalled its opposition to the deployment of reinforced NATO contingents on the Russian-Norwegian border. However, Jens Stoltenberg, who is leaving his job at the North Atlantic Alliance, will return to local politics in 2002. And he may well bring a more ‘Atlantic flavour’ to the actions of his comrades-in-arms. So the over-optimism about a special partnership with Norway can perhaps be abandoned.
There will be elections in 2022 in a number of other countries. The greatest interest, of course, is the outcome of the French presidential election. Only conservative candidate Valérie Pécrès has a real chance of beating Emmanuel Macron. It is not very clear whether this option would be favourable for Russia – she has not curtseyed in our direction. The French also face parliamentary elections – but these traditionally serve more as a “continuation” of the presidential elections. The likelihood that France will change its approach to Russia as a result of these elections is not very high.
But the Hungarian parliamentary elections are very much at stake for Russia. Viktor Orban, the long-serving prime minister, who has become almost our main partner in the EU, has been opposed by a large pro-Western coalition. It is very likely that Orban’s supporters will lose their constitutional majority. The question of keeping it simple is a major intrigue. If it can be preserved – special Russian-Hungarian relations are unlikely to go anywhere. In a different scenario, they could be awaiting almost the same degradation as in the case of the Czech Republic.
A new government should also emerge as a result of parliamentary elections in Sweden. This rather influential in the EU, rich country is not exactly one of Russia’s friends, but with the current centre-left cabinet it is more or less possible to maintain some kind of dialogue. The arrival of the centre-right could bring our relations down to the level of the Netherlands, or even much lower. Considering that there is no way around the Swedish waters of NSP2, there is, alas, plenty of room for anti-Russian manoeuvres.
Both parliamentary and presidential elections await Slovenia at once in 2022. Russia has a good relationship with the outgoing president Borut Pahor, which cannot be said of prime minister Janez Jansa. If a different political force forms the government, there is a chance of turning this country into a more or less “understanding” partner. Of course, the weight of the Slovenians in the EU cannot be called great – but it is not zero, and in these times any respectful dialogue with the Europeans can already be considered a positive development.
The parliamentary elections await Serbia and Latvia in 2022 as well but here the outcome is almost predetermined for Russia. One can only imagine that Serbs would vote en masse for a party advocating a break with Russia in a nightmare. The same (but only about a happy dream) can be said about Latvia. It is impossible to imagine a government coming to power, advocating real dialogue with Russia and rejection of 30 year Russophobia, unless you have a very rich imagination.
On the whole, Russia’s European path will be extremely difficult.
In the first six months, the EU presidency will be held by France, absorbed in the election campaign. Here there is a chance to leave things as they are. And in the second half of the year the ‘head’ of the EU will be the Czech Republic, whose government can be expected to do everything but unleash war directly on Russia. Therefore, we will have to prepare for unpleasant moments both at national and European level.
Interference in Russian affairs, the situation around Ukraine, passions over Nord Stream 2, value incompatibilities, common security issues – these are the most common issues on which Russia and the EU will engage in dialogue. And in some places, it is more likely to resemble a shouting match and a strong desire to put the other side in its place. Russia-EU relations in 2022 are those of two adversaries. And relations with individual countries are a conversation with very difficult, with few exceptions, partners.
Vadim Trukhachev, VZGLYAD