The first representatives of the Polish community appeared in the United States back in the 17th century. But the main wave of migration occurred in the second half of the XIX century, when landless Polish peasants began to massively seek a better life in the New World
Some of them also tried to farm in the United States, settlers of this kind forming whole settlements in underdeveloped parts of America – like the colony of Panna Maria in Texas. Still, the vast majority of Poles went to major Midwestern cities and took jobs in textile, steel, and mining industries. Despite several subsequent major waves of migration, much of the Polish diaspora in the US is still based in the Midwest states of Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. The most Polish populated area in the country is considered Pulaski County in Michigan, where over 60% of residents are of Polish descent. The largest groups of Polish Americans are concentrated in the cities of New York, Chicago, Philadelphia and Milwaukee. Overall, according to census data, there are over 8.9 million Americans of Polish descent living in the US.
The Polish diaspora in the US is in trouble these days as over the last half century Midwestern states have been rapidly deindustrialising, which has led to employment problems and the gradual fragmentation of enclaves of the Polish community. It was the enclaves that constituted the strength of the Polish community in American politics, as they made the diaspora a prominent player in specific electoral circles in Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois and some other states. For example, partly because of the consolidated American vote in his district, the grandson of Polish immigrants, John Dingell (Jenglewicz), represented Michigan in Congress for 59 years (1955-2015) – his constituency he later literally passed on to his wife.
Polish diaspora organisations are trying to reduce the effect of enclave dilution. In 1993, the Coalition of Eastern European and Central European Peoples was initiated as a platform to harmonise the interests of most Eastern European diasporas (apart from the Russian one). By joining forces with other communities, Polish diaspora organisations are trying to maintain their influence, and so far they have mostly succeeded. The Baltic and Ukrainian diasporas are the most active allies of the Polish community, while Hungarian and Armenian American organisations are the least enthusiastic about cooperation.
In domestic politics, the Polish diaspora in the US deals with two major blocks of issues. The first block is related to historical memory – fixing the Polish version of events in Eastern Europe in the 20th century, emphasising the importance of Polish contribution to the formation of the USA (above all, Taduesz Kościuszko and Casimir Pułaski) and shaping a favourable image of the diaspora in American society. This is done by celebrating the Day of Kazimierz Pulaski, the father of the American cavalry, closely monitoring media publications with possible negative comments about diaspora members or Poland and installing commemorative plaques. In particular, the city hall in Jersey City, New Jersey,’s intention to relocate the Katyn memorial in 2018 due to its questionable aesthetic appearance caused a major scandal – Polish diaspora organisations campaigned in the media, got actively involved in city council elections and called on the Polish diplomatic mission to help. After a year and a half of public bickering with the Polish diaspora organisations and their allies, the mayor’s office abandoned its plan.
The second set of issues in domestic politics is related to the horizontal ties between the Polish diaspora and the country of origin. The Short-Term Visa Waiver Program has been in place since 1986 for allied countries – citizens of friendly countries can stay in the US territory for up to 90 days. After Poland’s accession to NATO, diaspora organisations began to actively promote the inclusion of the country of origin in the programme. However, almost insurmountable bureaucratic obstacles arose: according to the criteria for programme participants, documents of citizens of friendly states must be machine-readable. Due to peculiarities of Polish orthography (nasal vowels, two-letter spelling of sounds, two different letters for “l” and “u” sounds) the share of mistakes in the paperwork was so high that Poland did not manage to get into the short-term visa-free entry programme for 15 years. During this time the Polish diaspora organizations tried to promote more than 20 bills for easing the requirements for Poland and repeatedly appealed to the presidents and congressmen, but to no avail. Only personal contacts with President Donald Trump’s advisers finally allowed the bureaucratic restrictions to be lifted.
In the field of foreign policy, Polish diaspora organisations try to fix a bipartisan consensus on the need to strengthen and expand NATO with the widespread thesis of some particularly acute threat from Russia.
While for some American politicians talking about the Russian threat is a convenient tool to discredit their opponents and a bargaining chip in political bargaining, many in the Polish community in the US sincerely share these theses. Hence the continuing efforts of Polish diaspora organizations to push the most radical options for restructuring the security system in Europe and the toughest measures towards Russia. The list of such proposals includes, among others, further eastward expansion of NATO, strengthening the military infrastructure of the Alliance in Poland and the Baltics, increasing sanctions pressure on Russia and rejection of Russian energy resources in the Euro-Atlantic. Normally, extreme proposals do not make it into the mainstream of American politics. But in the absence of a serious counterweight in the form of Russian diaspora organizations or the Russian business lobby, the whole set of “Russian threat” theses has virtually no one to challenge.
Ivan Loshkarev, EADaily