The Russian-American and Russian-Chinese summits held in December this year contrast literally in everything. Starting from the information background and the problems of negotiations and ending with the general surroundings of the events
With Washington, Moscow is painfully looking for and with great difficulty finding common ground that does not allow relations between the confronting powers to go into an uncontrollable peak. With China, Russia is measuredly discussing how to bring “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction” between friendly states to an even higher level.
With the United States, we are exchanging endless sanctions-counter-sanctions, we are expelling diplomats in a mirror-like manner, drawing new red lines across potentially escalating territories and, at times, as if we continue to settle scores of the long-ended Cold War. With the Celestial Empire, we are building pragmatic bilateral cooperation and successfully linking our projects of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the EAEU.
Even in the design of the Russian-American and Russian-Chinese summits, one can see their fundamental differences. On December 8, the leaders of the United States and the Russian Federation communicated against the background of their national banners. Behind the head of the White House is only an American flag. Behind the back of the owner of the Kremlin is only a tricolor. But on December 15, the flags of China and Russia were positioned strictly according to the protocol provided for bilateral summits.
On the whole, relations between Moscow and Beijing have been furnished almost exemplary in recent years. Unfortunately, the pandemic has made its own negative adjustments to the speed of movement of goods across the Russian-Chinese border. However, despite the unfavorable circumstances, the trade turnover between the countries by the end of 2021 should still grow by 34% and reach a record $ 130 billion.
Leaving aside the pandemic aberration, economic interaction between the PRC and the Russian Federation has been characterized by invariably positive dynamics since 1999. During this time, China’s share in Russia’s foreign trade turnover increased from 4% to 18%, which makes the $200 billion target set by the leaders of the two countries quite achievable. And in the foreseeable future.
It is extremely important that we are talking not only about raw materials, but also high-tech Russian exports to China. For example, in May, a start was made on the joint construction of four new power units at the Tianwan NPP. In addition, as the reorientation of the Celestial Empire towards domestic effective demand is inevitable in the context of deglobalization, Russia could well implement a long-term export strategy to promote domestic goods and services in the Chinese market. However, this issue will require an intensification of efforts not so much at the level of the federal center as in the interested regions of Siberia and the Far East.
In recent years, Beijing has consistently ranked first in the list of Moscow’s trading partners. But the European export direction still contributes more to the Russian budget. If we consider the ratio for the same natural gas, then 185 billion cubic meters of gas supplied to foreign markets by Gazprom, Power of Siberia accounts for only 10.2 billion cubic meters. Even though, compared to last year, the pumping of Russian blue fuel in the Chinese direction has more than doubled.
Only in a certain perspective, as the Power of Siberia reaches its design capacity and the possible commissioning of Power of Siberia-2, the Asian direction will be able to significantly insure Russian gas exports to Europe against potential geopolitical disruptions.
The intensification of joint work on the creation of an independent financial infrastructure for servicing trade operations between the Russian Federation and the PRC may become much more significant in hedging Russia’s risks in the West. Moscow and Beijing have been carrying out mutual settlements in national currencies for a long time, but today we can talk not just about increasing their share, but about bringing this process to a new technological level.
For many years, the United States and its European allies have periodically threatened to close Russia’s access to the SWIFT financial payment system. Of course, such a restrictive step is discussed primarily as a last resort, but this does not prevent the West from using the threat of its use as an instrument of pressure on the Kremlin. Thus, the intensification of Russian-Chinese interaction in the framework of the development of alternative international financial instruments and mechanisms is extremely important both in itself and in view of the potential complications with the implementation of Moscow’s trade operations in the US-European direction.
In turn, Russia insures China against eventual military threats. Moscow’s help in setting up a Chinese missile warning system is critical for Beijing. Of course, we are not talking about the emergence of a military alliance and the restriction of the freedom of maneuver of each of the countries in Asia and the world, but one cannot but to note that the interaction of the armed forces of Russia and China in recent years has been proceeding along the same upward trajectory as the trade and economic relations between the two countries.
From the point of view of maximum hedging of any risks, it is very important for Moscow, in addition to its strategic partnership with Beijing, to maintain a positive dynamic of contacts with New Delhi. Including in the military sphere. About 70% of the weapons in the Indian armed forces are produced in the USSR or Russia. However, on the whole, the trade turnover between our countries is currently disproportionate to the potential that is historically inherent in Russian-Indian relations.
Hardly anyone else has doubts that the 21st century will be the century of Asia. The reorientation of Russia’s foreign policy accents from West to East will occur gradually. For some time, the Asian vector will remain for Moscow an additional, backup and safety direction, designed to balance problematic and conflicting, but still more significant relations with Western partners.
Alexander Vedrussov, Izvestia newspaper