Putin-Biden talk as a manifestation of strength and ambition

For some reason unknown to me, part of the Russian experts, as soon as the conversation between Presidents Putin and Biden was over, began to talk about some kind of surrender by Washington of its positions. I do not know where and in what they saw this change, but from the statements of both heads of state, made following the conversation, this conclusion does not follow at all

So, let’s start with the fact that, starting from the two-hour format of the conversation, many observers argue that the presidents managed to examine in detail all the problems of bilateral relations. This is a common mistake: a person automatically evaluates the conversation as if he himself spoke for two hours in a row. In fact, more than an hour was spent on translation, while each of the interlocutors had about half an hour to formulate their position. This is not so much, given that both interlocutors are used to formulating their thoughts as concretely as possible, that is, they are not limited to one short sentence, giving a detailed answer, one can roughly estimate the number of topics discussed at three to five pieces. Of these, interrelated topics are clearly identified:

– NATO expansion to the East;

– the situation around Ukraine;

– creation of a new joint structure to address security issues;

– a possible new package of US sanctions.

The parties’ reactions to the above questions were traditional. In particular, the United States has once again (as has happened many times over the past twenty years) that Russia does not have the right to veto NATO expansion, and the bloc itself will decide who and when to admit to its ranks. This is just a statement of a long-known fact, and in no way means that NATO is going to expand in the near future. NATO is simply not going to give guarantees of its non-expansion, leaving itself room for maneuver.

Why did the topic come up right now?

Because a public statement by the United States about the refusal of further NATO advancement to the East would disavow the strategic course of Ukrainian foreign policy. Kiev would have to think about an unpleasant future. It would also significantly cool the hotheads in Ukraine looking for an opportunity to organize a military provocation in the interests of the United States. That is why (and not because they are going to admit Ukraine to NATO) the United States will not make such a statement or give written commitments not to expand NATO. Moreover, formally, Washington could not say anything else, since this position is the fruit of the consensus of the alliance countries.

Biden said that in the event of a “Russian attack on Ukraine,” the United States would not send troops to help Kiev. But we have written about this more than once, and it has also been clear for a long time, and American diplomats and presidents have spoken about this more than once. In particular, at the peak of the Russian Spring, when Kiev was seriously afraid that unmarked military men would occupy not only Crimea, but the entire South-East of Ukraine (and they might even come to the capital), the Americans publicly stated that even if Russia would occupy all of Ukraine, Washington will not defend it.

This is understandable. First, a nuclear power won’t attack another nuclear power to defend a useless limitrophe — it’s too risky. Secondly, the task of the United States was not to fight with Russia itself, but to have Russia at war with anyone, and they watched from the sidelines and received dividends (as it was during the First and Second World Wars).

The refusal to defend Ukraine fit into the framework of this task. Let Moscow occupy a huge (by European standards) country, with a completely destroyed economy, destroyed political and administrative verticals, permeated through and through with an all-consuming corruption tradition, with a poor population of dubious loyalty, and then solve a bunch of complex problems, and the Americans will have their hands free in all strategically important points of the planet.

This idea was not implemented by the United States in 2014: Russia did not fall for the American bait, but Washington did not abandon it. It just transformed. And now, for greater efficiency, the United States is ready to sacrifice not one (Ukrainian) pawn, but several Eastern European ones. However, it is still not possible to organize a war in Washington, so you have to maneuver and periodically return to the negotiation process.

Joint work on resolving international security issues has always become a topical issue on the Russian-American (formerly Soviet-American) agenda during periods of aggravation of relations between the two states. We are talking about avoiding a “war by mistake”, when an ordinary political crisis develops into a conflict between nuclear powers due to an incorrect assessment of the opponent’s capabilities and intentions, an attempt to take risks by playing to raise rates. Now relations between Russia and the United States are as bad as ever, and all the previous mechanisms of insurance against “war by mistake” either no longer work or are not effective enough in the new conditions. Therefore, the new structure (if it can be created, which is written with a pitchfork on the water) should not cancel the crisis is, and discipline him a little, driving him into a certain framework that is safe for Moscow and Washington.

However, I think that this idea will be stillborn. Despite the fact that Biden immediately began to consult with his Western European colleagues and announced his intention to organize a meeting in the Russia-NATO format in the near future, the United States itself is so disliked by the restrictions that hamper their game that even if they manage to agree on something, it is unlikely such a mechanism will work. Moreover, it will be difficult to agree – the NATO bureaucracy, which will inevitably claim a key role in such negotiations, worrying about preserving its jobs and budgets, traditionally takes a more hawkish position than any of the NATO countries individually and even all of them together. So in this case, the United States, without fear of a dirty trick, can play the role of a “good policeman”, Stoltenberg will be “bad”.

The fact that the Americans will not abandon their attempts to involve Ukraine in an armed conflict with Russia is evidenced by the persistent threats of the United States to launch a new (“absolutely terrible”, “which has not yet been”) package of anti-Russian sanctions. However, so far only disconnecting from SWIFT has been announced, which will not cause critical damage to Russia (although there will be troubles and losses), and the Americans also hope that the Europeans themselves will decide to abandon the SP-2, but Washington will not impose sanctions against the pipeline. This is a concession to the United States, but not to Russia, but to its Western European partners, who look with dismay at the American game around Ukraine and do not want to lose the billions they invested in the construction of the Nord Stream-2, as well as abandon trade with Russia, which is critical for Europe.

In general, the next negotiation pause ended in the same way as all similar ones before it: the parties exchanged views on life and remained with their own. The presidents commented on the negotiations each independently, there was no joint statement, that is, it was not possible to come to a rapprochement of positions that would allow such a statement to be reached, and this (after the recent communication between Lavrov and Blinken) was not expected.

It must be understood that the United States is still too strong and ambitious to yield, and Russia is already too strong and ambitious to yield (especially considering that the United States clearly wants to get more than it can swallow). In such conditions, the maximum that can (if possible) be agreed upon is to avoid a direct collision between the military machines of Russia and the United States, while the crisis at this stage cannot be exhausted, in view of the diametrically opposed interests of the parties and the hopes of each of them for victory.

However, Zelenskiy has the biggest problem following the results of these negotiations. The US publicly refuses to support Ukraine with an armed hand, while persistently pushing Kiev into a war with Russia. And the domestic political situation in Ukraine is such that it will be very difficult for Zelensky to rebel against the fulfillment of American demands.

Rostislav Ischenko, Ukraina.ru