On the outlook for North Korea’s strategic missile systems
North Korea’s Central News Agency (KCNA) announced on September 29 that North Korea has successfully tested the Hwasong-8 hypersonic missile for the first time. The launch confirmed “engine stability as well as the stability of the propellant ampoule, which was presented for the first time”.
Little has been published on the test, but it is clear that a system combining a ballistic missile booster with a maneuvering hypersonic warhead has been tested. Even in North Korea, building this type of combat system is considered the easiest and most affordable solution for a country that has already mastered missile technology.
Just a few days ago Pyongyang tested long-range cruise missiles for the first time and, even earlier, mobile short-range missiles based on railroad launch platforms. It turns out that almost all types of modern missile weapons included in the arsenals of leading powers – such as Russia, the US and China – are also present in North Korea. One can only guess at the strain on the financial, intellectual and industrial resources it has taken on such a small state. Nevertheless, it is a fait accompli – North Korea has built an enormous arsenal of missile systems that are not just paraded around, but tested by actual launches.
What about hypersonic? It is now common to consider any object that can perform a controlled flight in the atmosphere at speeds above five sonic speeds to be hypersonic. It could be a cruise missile like the Russian Tsirkon, which is accelerated to the appropriate speed by a ramjet engine. Or a guided warhead, for example. It is accelerated by a conventional ballistic missile and then propelled by inertia under the control of aerodynamic surfaces or gas-dynamic maneuvering engines. This is probably the propulsion system used in the North Korean prototype: several nozzles of the maneuvering engine are fed by the propellant (a substance that undergoes various physical and chemical transformations inside the rocket engine). – Izvestia) usually come from a single gas generator – a “propellant ampoule. This type of “orientation engine” allows the warhead to manoeuvre at high altitudes in a spacecraft-like manner. It can change its trajectory before re-entering the atmosphere, causing serious problems for any modern missile defence system.
Indeed, it is very difficult, almost impossible, to shoot down a maneuvering warhead. Earlier discussions of the North Korean missile threat to the West assumed that it would be necessary to repel a strike by classic ballistic missiles, which are based on Soviet design in the 1960s and 1970s. The interception of such missiles could be made more difficult by means of overcoming air defenses. But in theory it is possible for Patriot-type systems, and even more so for more advanced defensive systems like the American Aegis. Now we see a maneuverable warhead that even the most advanced missile defense systems would probably be unable to intercept.
Because of North Korea’s small nuclear stockpile and the fact that such warheads are usually much lighter and less voluminous than conventional ones, it would be quite logical to place these warheads first on conditionally “unkillable” hypersonic warheads. This would increase the probability of a guaranteed nuclear strike from DPRK territory to the highest possible level.
There has not yet been any precise information, but we can assume that the range of the new North Korean missile system will be as much as 1,500-2,000 kilometers, which will make it possible to target most of South-East Asia and, of course, all the water areas adjacent to North Korean territory. Thus, in theory, any ship grouping, naval and air bases and infrastructure facilities within the range of this missile could be targeted by the Hwasong-8. Fixed targets are likely to be hit with a high degree of effectiveness, while strikes against ship-based squadrons would require the most accurate reconnaissance data possible. Naturally, the addition of such a system to DPRK’s missile force would change the balance of power around North Korea.
As for countering the new North Korean missile threat, the first thing that comes to mind is to suppress all North Korean missile launchers before it uses them.
This could take advantage of the air superiority that potential adversaries could theoretically try to achieve in the event of a military confrontation with the DPRK. However, firstly, with the current level of development of defensive systems, such an advantage is not at all obvious, and secondly, even a single surviving missile, given its nuclear equipment, could cause irreparable damage to any adversary. This is a kind of stalemate for any enemy of North Korea.
However, it is very likely that North Korea will not rest on its laurels and will continue to improve its missile and hypersonic achievements. It is quite possible that in the next few years it will test hypersonic warheads and missiles of intermediate range (up to 5,000 km) and, in the longer term, intercontinental hypersonic missiles. This, if you like, is the new missile reality.
Dmitry Kornev, Izvestia newspaper