The desire of Angela Merkel’s entourage and Merkel herself not to allow Markus Söder, who heads both the CSU and Bavaria, to lead the party, could lead the CDU/CSU bloc to electoral defeat
And it seems the party leadership is prepared to risk defeat just to prevent Markus Söder from becoming chancellor.
The central question that the CDU/CSU decided on was the question of Merkel’s “legacy”, i.e. the continuation of her course in general: moderate conservatism, moderately regulated market, moderate social policy, moderate defence of German sovereignty, moderate partnership with the United States, equal relations with Russia (cooperate in economy, finish the Nord Stream 2, denounce Ukraine and Navalny, but moderately).
There have been pluses and minuses in Merkel’s four terms in power, and for different forces, different ones. Some wanted a greater focus on America, others lamented the lack of improvement in the financial situation of Germans, frozen at the level of a decade ago. Some were unhappy about the restrictions “because of the pandemic”, others (most of them) about the migrant situation. The popularity of the Social Democrats has dropped to almost zero, turning from the leading left-wing party into a junior partner of the Christian Democrats.
On the whole, Merkel’s power has been perceived as too “moderate and careful”. As a result, the CDU/CSU still won the 2017 elections, but already with a sharp drop in electoral support. What will happen in the elections in autumn 2021 is not yet clear.
Outside the CDU/CSU, the Eurosceptics from the Alternative for Germany strengthened on one flank and the Euro-Atlantists from the Greens on the other. The CDU/CSU was no longer on the right as it had been but somewhere in the middle, balancing and increasingly unsatisfying.
In the April 2021 polls the Christian Democrats got about 30% of the possible support of the voters in the Autumn Election, the Greens about 21%. Other polls split the vote evenly: about 25% each.
Angela Merkel’s supporter Armin Lachet, described by some journalists as “a descendant of Charlemagne”, defeated Friedrich Merz, who had opposed Merkel on the right, as party leader during the winter. However, his victory was controversial because Lachet was forced to ally himself with the so-called “anti-Merkel” Jens Spahn, who had commercial links with the rival Free Democrats (and who is also a registered homosexual). In April, Lachet faced the growing popularity of CSU leader Söder, who advocates extensive cooperation with Russia.
Lachet is also in favour of cooperation with Russia, but in a moderate version: Nord Stream to be built, the “poisoning and arrest” of Navalny to be sharply condemned, “compliance” to be demanded from Russia.
All polls showed that voters would be more likely to vote for the CDU/CSU if Söder were in charge than Lachet, but the party board imposed Lachet. The CDU/CSU ratings immediately plummeted by seven points, while the Greens jumped by almost 30 percent. The party has nominated Annalena Berbock as its candidate for German chancellor, who is eager to fight cyber-attacks, protect the climate and solve conflicts between “liberal and authoritarian societies”. At 16, Annalena spent a year on a school exchange in Florida, then studied at the London School of Economics and interned at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. Her support is growing against the sluggish Lachet not so much due to the content of her ideas, but to her personal energy.
The CDU/CSU leadership has offered Germany a choice between the tiresome moderation of the “Merkel era” and the assertiveness of the energetic Berbock, whose ratings are rising while Lachet’s are declining.
Things could develop differently from here on. Merkel’s entourage is leading the CDU to defeat so far, but that is not even the point. The point is the consequences that a possible CDU defeat in the elections in September could have for the country.
The Greens are against Nord Stream 2. Since they are also against conventional energy (both coal and the atom), they will inevitably advocate getting gas from the US and at US prices. That would mean increasing German dependence on the US and reducing the profitability of German industry. And because Berbock is also affiliated with the supranational structures of the “climate activists”, the interests of real German production will increasingly recede into the background.
For Germany, this will be unfortunate, but Germany is different too. And the question arises why, on the one hand, Bavaria with its industrial potential, traditional values and a leader like Markus Söder, and, on the other hand, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that runs through the Baltic Sea, reaches the European coast, needs such a policy.
Sergei Chernyakhovsky, FGC