I believe that Joe Biden was quite aware of all the consequences of his “shuffling” with George Stephanopoulos, as he sees no point in personal contacts with Vladimir Putin
It was Donald Trump who sought to communicate, expecting to be able to bypass the state apparatus in a business-like manner. Biden is not interested in this because it will not be possible to reach new agreements that require mutual trust, because there is no trust on either side in principle. There is no common agenda either.
Anthony Blinken’s declaration that the USA will no longer introduce democracy by military means will paradoxically contribute to the fact that the chances of a common agenda in the future may diminish even more. Such an agenda appears when the US needs assistance to legitimise its status, for example through the UN Security Council (as was the case with the Americans in Iraq), or starts to resolve related issues (the oil contracts in Iraq, for example). If there is no need, there is a problem with the agenda. Limited cooperation on counter-terrorism issues between special services will continue – top-level relations are not needed for that, there is a pragmatic interest here.
Things are very complicated with Afghanistan – given that it was the Democrats who accused Russia of paying the Taliban for murdered Americans. At the time, Trump did not believe that version – but he is no longer in the White House. Now Russia is seeking to mediate in Afghanistan (and there is a meeting on the Afghan issue today in Moscow), but the US is betting on Turkish mediation – a subject for rapprochement between Washington and Ankara.
The US has never put its Ukrainian policy on a par with that of Iraq (unlike Russia, for which they are links in the same chain) – and they will continue and probably increase support to the Ukrainian authorities – if and when they are convinced that it will be used more effectively than now. For now, they are lobbying for the appointment of Ruslan Ryaboshapka (who has just received an award from Blinken) as the chief corruption fighter. So in Ukraine, the US will stimulate a reformatting of the power system without Russian involvement. There is no longer any hope of progress within the framework of the Minsk agreements. The question of gas transit stability over the medium term is settled, and the Nord Stream 2 issue will be resolved as part of the Biden administration’s relationship with the Republicans in the Senate on the one hand and Germany on the other.
In the Middle East, the balance is also not conducive to discussions at the level of the two countries’ leaders. In Syria, Russia is playing a complex game, manoeuvring between Iran, Turkey and Israel (while there is also the factor of Bashar al-Assad, who in turn is manoeuvring between Russia and Iran and dreams of regaining control over all the territory of the country inherited from his father). All four external players have their own interests, they mutually limit each other, and the US is left to make sure that Iran does not get too strong and the Turks do not crush the Kurds. In Libya, Russia and Turkey are tacitly agreeing directly – one less burden for the US. In the Iranian question neither the US nor Iran has considered Russia as a key player since the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (that was long ago).
The joint fight against the pandemic has come up against a vaccine war. But that’s not even the main point. Russia has an excellent vaccine, but it scales worse than the far more mediocre Oxford one. The US under Biden is vaccinating its population at such a rapid pace that it will soon be able to share its vaccine stockpile with its partners (most notably AstraZeneca, which is supported by WHO – and is likely to be partially rehabilitated in Europe by limiting its vaccine supply). The Russian vaccine in this situation could be used as an additional factor – it is important, but not enough to affect a change in inter-state relations.
The notion that one should be careful with Russia so as not to increase the influence of the siloviki and harm the more moderate groups in power is a thing of the past. Another thing is that the alarmist expectation of bashing plates in the form of SWIFT’s shutdown is not likely to come true either. Rather the bet will be on a consistent cutting off Russia from cheap money and modern technology which will affect not only the present but the future as well.
Alexei Makarkin