“Power in our country belongs to the people”, – Pashinyan said before the rally
The way out of the crisis for the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who is seeking his resignation not only from the opposition but also from the army command, is offered. It envisages that Pashinyan will retain power for a transitional period, but will hold early elections. It seems sensible, but there is a problem: the scheme is needed to boost support in Armenia for the EU and NATO.
On Monday there will be a rally of supporters of Nikol Pashinyan in Yerevan. It is a thankless task to predict its numbers, but they may unpleasantly surprise the opposition, where it has been argued that the vast majority of Armenians want the prime minister out.
The fact that street protests by the opposition itself are relatively few in number and nothing in comparison with those on the wave of which Pashinyan came to power is explained there by the winter cold and apathy of Armenian society, which has suffered a national tragedy because of the lost war in Karabakh.
The Prime Minister is now mobilising amongst forces loyal to him, but no matter how many people turn out for his procession in the centre of the Armenian capital, it is already clear that Pashinyan will announce his refusal to resign, something that almost the entire Armenian army high command is now calling for him to do.
The stated aim of Pashinyan’s event is to defend the “constitutional order” and “people’s power”. In declaratory terms this corresponds to Moscow’s official position on the Armenian crisis – ‘settlement within the framework of the law’. In practice, this means that Prime Minister Pashinyan will use the rally to pressure President Sarkisian into signing a decree dismissing Chief of General Staff Hovik Gasparyan for insubordination, thus resolving the conflict in favour of the incumbent government.
In other words, despite being declared “politically bankrupt” dozens of times and “national traitor” about as many times, Pashinyan intends to remain at the head of the executive power. Preferably until the next parliamentary elections in 2023, which, by all appearances, he also expects to win.
Only parliament, where the premier’s supporters are in the majority, can legally remove him, and these are often people who owe their entire careers to Pashinyan and would not survive in politics without him.
But in the preparatory phase of the march, a force that everyone seems to have forgotten about – the parliamentary opposition – intervened in the conflict. The Bright Armenia Party (another translation is Enlightened Armenia), represented by its leader Edmond Marukyan, proposed the second option of resolving the situation “by law”, which would suit not only Pashinyan, but a wider range of stakeholders.
The point of this compromise is as follows. Pashinyan gives up the idea of dismissing Gasparyan and resigns after all, but does not resign from power and remains Prime Minister until extraordinary elections. This will be made possible by the fact that Bright Armenia will give up the right to nominate its own candidate for the position of the new head of government.
The scheme will work if another opposition parliamentary party, Prosperous Armenia’s Gagik Tsarukyan, now stripped of parliamentary immunity, does the same. Tsarukyan is a special case – he is one of the richest people in the country and an entrepreneur, as they would say in the nineties, of “authoritative” or “purely concrete” persuasion. But it is possible to come to an agreement with him. Suppose he too would sign a compromise. And then what?
Then the crisis should be over. Each side of the conflict will seem to be able to consider itself satisfied.
The general staff and the army would be left holding their own.
A bloc of 17 opposition parties demanding Pashinyan’s resignation in the streets will have the chance to formalise popular consent for a change of government, given that these forces are currently not represented at all in the National Assembly (parliament).
Pashinyan continues to lead the country until a plebiscite of confidence in himself which, strange as it may seem to some, he may well win. Despite all the scandals and the lost war, he is still the most popular politician in Armenia, and his opponents are associated with the previous government, which left during the “love revolution” and is not enthusiastic among voters. This may all change by the 2023 elections – the opposition will reform and strengthen, but for now, its prospects cannot be called brilliant.
Tsarukyan will get something, too, if he agrees to the scheme.
In the end, the crisis, dangerous for the country, will be resolved, and the supreme arbiter will be the people, whose right to do so seems to be recognized by all parties to the conflict.
On this topic.
Pashinyan is still needed by Russia
Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh are threatened by “collective thug”.
Political analyst explains Pashinyan’s insistence on firing Chief of General Staff of Armenia
Finally, such a variant of events, when Pashinyan does not become the unambiguous and the only winner, should suit official Moscow. It is believed that the Russian leadership has no sympathy for him, given his flirtation with the West and revolutionary past.
The fact that the formal reason for the current conflict between the prime minister and the General Staff of Armenia is Pashinyan’s groundless criticism of Russian “Iskanders” (if truth be told, a direct and brazen lie on his part) has also attracted attention in Moscow.
In terms of Russian interests, Marukyan and Bright Armenia are doing us a favour by refusing to claim the premiership. For the simple reason that they are for Moscow an unacceptable contender for power, even against the background of Pashinyan, whereas the Republican Party (the ruling party before Pashinyan and now setting the tone in the street opposition) is considered acceptable.
This, at least, is how political analysts sympathetic to Bright Armenia interpret the situation. In reality, however, the compromise it proposes looks very much like a scam.
Through this scheme, the party of Marukyan – formerly Pashinyan’s ally in the opposition Yelk bloc – clearly expects to increase its representation in parliament as a third force (or fourth, if Tsarukyan’s people, who have their own specifics, are considered). This is supported by the large “anti-rating” of both main players: Pashinyan (as the man who lost the war and quarrelled with the army) and the street opposition (because the events of 2018 are still alive in the memory).
If the elections are held later, on schedule, the main forces may become stronger and the third, on the contrary, weaker. The current “troubled times” and the lack of obvious leaders in Armenian politics, with whom the public would associate its hopes rather than choosing on the basis of “the others are even worse”, are playing into the hands of “Light Armenia”.
This, of course, is logical: the authors of the compromise have to get something for themselves. Bright Armenia cannot count on a full-fledged victory, but it can count on some increase in parliamentary seats (currently 17 out of 132).
However, the nature of this political force must be taken into account. Again, unacceptable for Moscow.
In short, “Bright Armenia” is a liberal pro-EU and pro-NATO, advocating Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO and the EEU.
Comments are superfluous. Strengthening Washington and Brussels’ clientele in Armenia is not in Russia’s interests.
Its interests with regard to the situation in Armenia are generally interpreted in a false way – both by political analysts close to “Bright Armenia” and many others. Moscow is primarily interested in the implementation by Yerevan of the agreements it undertook at the end of the second Karabakh war, as it is all the more unacceptable for it to risk the peacekeepers once again because of intra-Armenian disputes over ‘who is to blame’.
Pashinyan’s commitment to the separation of powers is now extremely unpleasant. No matter how one feels about him, he is the one who signed up to these commitments, so he has minimal room for dangerous and undesirable manoeuvring.
If he agrees to early elections, let him. In the context of the settlement issue, his new victory will suit Russia. And the other contender for power, the Republican Party, whose leadership is very influential within the armed forces and in Karabakh, is perceived by Moscow as a familiar partner who can easily be dissuaded from making undesirable moves.
But the fulfilment of the terms of peace is the first requirement. It is better if it is realised without the strengthening of the Atlanticists and “Light Armenia”. Even if there is no early vote and Pashinyan will have to be tolerated longer than we would like.