Local Serbian and regional media have recently been reporting that the European Union could demand that Serbia formally recognizes Kosovo’s independence, as one of the conditions for joining this organization.
An example is the former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel’s statement, “if Serbia wants to move toward the EU, the building of the rule of law is a primary condition, but naturally also the acceptance of Kosovo’s independence”, Gabriel said.
Currently it is not an official condition yet, but following the chronology of events from October 5, 2000, when the USA and the EU carried out the first “colored revolution” in Serbia (then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and when Serbia found itself on the “European path”, this country has been facing nothing but one condition after another. The first one was the extradition of former Serbian and FRY President Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague Tribunal for alleged war crimes, which was done in 2001. Practically the complete military and political leadership from the period of NATO aggression on the FRY was handed over to the Hague Tribunal. After that, all state-owned companies were privatized sloppily and without any questions asked; the results of the Montenegro’s independence referendum were recognized, and “normalization of relations with Kosovo” began. This condition is a gross violation of international law and the UN Charter, as well as UN Resolution 1244, which beside that is also extremely dangerous as it opens a possibility for further division of Serbia, given the Muslim minority in the Raska region and separatists in Serbia’s northern autonomous province of Vojvodina. Bit, it doesn’t end here. Namely, one of the possible new conditions for the country’s accession might be imposing sanctions against the Russian Federation, Serbia’s traditional ally, a fraternal country with which Serbia has very good political, military, cultural and economic relations. In order to open Chapter 31 on foreign policy in the negotiations with the EU, the Government in Belgrade will have to further align with Brussels’ declarations and decisions to a much greater extent than before. Chapter 31 is entitled “Foreign, Security and Defense Policy” and it states that Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under the foreign, security and defense policy, to align with EU statements, take part in EU actions and apply agreed sanctions and restrictive measures.
What would possible sanctions against Russia mean in reality? Firstly, Russian companies could no longer invest in the Serbian economy and infrastructure, as large companies such as Gazprom or Russian Railways did in previous years. Also, a great number of agricultural entrepreneurs would no longer be able to place their products on Russian and the Eurasian Union markets. All this would indisputably affect the quality of life of ordinary people, just as it did in 2015 when the EU sanctions against Russia affected and are still affecting the quality of life of farmers in many European countries. At the same time, Serbia would probably have to end military cooperation with Russia, which includes ending the modernization of the Serbian army by procuring modern weapons from Russia, as well as buying air defense systems, which are greatly needed for the country’s security as proven in 1999 during the NATO aggression on the FRY.
Serbia’s official policy since 2012 has been accession in the EU, but not at any cost; on military level its policy is military neutrality. The country has so far participated in several military drills with Russia and Belarus, and is also the only one in the Balkans (not counting Bosnia where the Serbs have the right of veto) that has not imposed sanctions on Russia and does not plan to join NATO. Also, thanks to the Russian veto, Kosovo has not yet been recognized by the UN as a sovereign state, and at the same time Russia has provided assistance to Serbia several times, especially during natural disasters, floods and fires, as well as during the first wave of coronavirus. However, this year things are slowly starting to change. The European Union keeps increasing the pressure which in 2020 forced Serbia to cancel its army participation in the joint military exercises with Russia and Belarus called “Slavic Brotherhood”, traditionally held since 2015. At the same time, the Serbian government in resignation joined the European declaration qualifying the elections in Belarus as “undemocratic”, a decision which Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic justified by “harmonizing foreign policy with EU foreign policy”, despite the fact that Serbia did not have observers in the elections. Belarus and that the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, is a proven long-time friend of Serbia, who even visited Serbia during NATO aggression in 1999, risking his own life.
All this raises a question – what’s next on the list? Is it the recognition of Kosovo, and then sanctions against Russia? At this moment, it is difficult to give a precise answer, but the danger of imposing new conditions certainly exists. There is only hope that the Serbian leadership will have enough strength to oppose such demands, at least because accepting such demands would be contrary to the interests and wishes of the Serbian people.