The Nord Stream 2 saga received an interesting continuation, in the sense that American attempts to stop the commissioning of the Russian gas pipeline may lead not only to the fact that it will receive additional support from European politicians, but also to the fact that the European Union will be concerned about systemic protection from US sanctions.
If we compare the damage to American interests from Nord Stream 2 and the damage caused by the creation of an anti-vandal (anti-sanction) financial and economic system in the European Union itself, then the Russian gas pipeline is practically irrelevant. And if Washington is deprived of the opportunity to put pressure on Brussels or European companies with sanctions on really important issues, then for American foreign policy it will be a catastrophe on a planetary scale.
Last week, the conflict between Washington and Brussels, and in fact, the State Department and the European Commission, escalated because the heads of American and European diplomacy exchanged threats and statements containing mutual harsh criticism.
Mike Pompeo decided to destroy the so-called Tillerson clause – a restriction on the imposition of sanctions against companies that facilitated the construction of Nord Stream 2 before the adoption of the sanctions law. This “clause”, the appearance of which in the initial package of anti-Russian and “anti-Gazprom” sanctions is attributed to the then Secretary of State Tillerson, who understood that it was a very bad idea to “punish” the large European oil and gas companies, was canceled ahead of Pompeo’s trip to the European Union, which could be perceived as a gesture of intimidation. The head of the State Department even went over to direct threats, demanding from all companies that have or were involved in the project to “get out” or receive sanctions, which (if guided by American standards and historical experience) would involve the destruction of their American business, disconnection from the dollar system, confiscation of property and a travel ban for their directors. In addition to the fact that a huge number of European companies that are engaged in, for example, port services or insurance, may fall under the roller of American sanctions, it seems (and it is shared by some Western media) that the State Department is also hinting at its readiness to “punish” the leading European partners of Gazprom, that is Wintershall, OMV, Engie, Shell and Uniper.
On the one hand, such an escalation is a powerful step in terms of demonstrating the seriousness of Washington’s intentions in terms of blocking Nord Stream 2. On the other hand, it is not very clear what can be achieved in terms of demonstrating anything other than intentions: the money of Gazprom’s European partners has already been invested in the project, and the pipeline itself is being completed by the efforts of the Russian company itself, which is now the sole shareholder of the company that owns the pipeline.
In this sense, even if foreign companies wanted to “leave” the project, it simply cannot be done – the train has already left. It turns out that sanctions against European companies would be just revenge, absolutely pointless from the point of view of blocking the gas pipeline. Of course, Washington can try to impose sanctions against the buyers of Russian gas in Europe, but this will create a whole series of technical problems and foreign policy risks.
It is quite easy to set up schemes for the sale of Gazprom’s gas in such a way that it would be rather difficult to determine the end buyers, thus giving the United States a choice: to close its eyes to the ineffectiveness of the sanctions or to introduce “carpet” sanctions against all companies that will be suspected of buying Russian gas.
This scenario of further escalation is quite possible, but Washington is unlikely to like the consequences.
EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Josep Borrell, in a written statement, condemned the American methods of influencing the European Union:
“I am deeply concerned about the growing use of sanctions by the United States against European companies and interests. We have witnessed this developing trend in the cases of Iran, Cuba, the International Criminal Court, and most recently in the case of the Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream projects. <…> European policy should be determined here in Europe, not by third countries. In cases where the goals of foreign and security policy (related to the European Union and the United States. – ed.) are common, coordinating targeted sanctions with partners is very valuable. We have seen many positive examples of this and will continue to coordinate the sanctions where we can. And where there are political differences, the European Union is always open to dialogue. But this dialogue cannot take place against the background of the threat of sanctions”.
This statement could be perceived as an insignificant “concern” of the diplomat, to which Washington will not pay any attention, if not for one nuance. The American media, in particular the business information agency Bloomberg, have already reported that Germany is considering retaliatory sanctions against the United States in order to avenge sanctions against Nord Stream 2 and wean the United States from interfering in European energy policy.
And in the context of Borrell’s statement, it is worth recalling how he recently responded to a French MEP’s question about US sanctions:
“The Commission is paving the way for the adoption of an enhanced sanctions mechanism that will increase Europe’s resilience to the impact of extraterritorial sanctions imposed by third countries” .Borrell did not specify what form the mechanism will take or when it will be introduced, the British news agency Reuters reported two weeks ago.
The most obvious mechanism that can literally dismantle the entire US sanctions agenda in the gas sector in Europe could be sanctions against US export LNG. A protective tariff of 25%, or simply a ban on the import of American LNG into Europe, will not only make sanctions against Nord Stream 2 completely meaningless in terms of promoting American LNG on the European market, but will also directly harm American energy companies, some of which sponsor Republican Party of the United States. The forced termination of already concluded contracts is a serious loss, and American companies are hardly ready to pay with their own money for the geopolitical ambitions of Mike Pompeo and Russophobic senators. However, European diplomats can come up with some alternative options.
Fortunately, there are plenty of “pain points” for American business in the European Union. If the course of European diplomacy does not change, and the United States nevertheless runs into retaliatory sanctions from Brussels, then it will be possible to state that the completion of Nord Stream 2 will lead to results that few could count on, because in addition to increasing the stability of energy supplies to Europe, relations between the United States and the European Union will enter the phase of the sanctions war. To avoid this risk, the State Department should have stopped its threats against the European energy giants right now, but this is hardly possible – to stop would mean recognizing the right of Europeans to sovereignty, and the American elite, in principle, cannot afford this.
Ivan Danilov, RIA