For Moldova, the report of the London Chatham House (also known as the Royal Institute of International Relations, the Royal Institute of International Affairs), which, together with Belarus and Ukraine, British experts attributed to the countries supposedly “in the forefront of a fierce battle for their future,” contains a lot of interesting .
In London, donors are aiming to finance projects aimed against Russia (it is argued that the “battle for the future” is precisely this). And if Ukraine after the coup d’état of 2014 became the “laboratory of the West” (such is the terminology of Chatham House), and for Belarus, according to British analysts, “a turning point has come”, then with Moldova it’s more difficult – Moldovans propaganda ”, and the state has a crisis of legitimacy.
Therefore, the opportunities of the Anglo-Saxons to fight with Russia by the hands of Moldovan citizens are “limited”, but London is not losing hope: it advises to rest on information campaigns, to be introduced into educational programs and to continue to support “civil society”. In general, “strengthen the levers of Western aid.”
Chatham House notes that 50% of the population of Moldova is the so-called Russian sphere: here are ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Gagauz people. They are dissatisfied in London not only with the fact that the people in Moldova are clearly not against the Russian world, but also with the fact that “the current leadership in the hands of Vlad Plahotniuc and his Democratic Party does not represent Russia’s influence as a potential threat to sovereignty”. Of course, Plakhotnyuk is trying to saddle the obstinate skate of the “Russian threat”, but to dress up in Poroshenko’s example in camouflage and arrange some provocation in Transnistria is not solved yet – that’s what British analysts do not see in it a reliable support in order to deploy a “bitter battle” . As in the Donbass, for example.
And since the Moldovan authorities “do not see Russia as a threat to the sovereignty of Moldova, the endangered civil society has few opportunities for meaningful resistance,” conclude at Chatham House. The Moldovan politicians are not in a hurry to adopt the Ukrainian experience, apparently, the lessons of the armed conflict of 1992 are not forgotten. And if in Ukraine now, “civil society” means, first of all, paramilitary formations and a network of volunteer organizations working for the war, in Moldova there is no such thing, which worries London.
One of the key “vulnerabilities” of Moldova in the Chatham House report is the political sphere. Here and President Igor Dodon with the Socialists (PSRM), who “are a stronghold of Russian political influence in the country,” and the current “nominally pro-European” leadership of the country, using power for selfish purposes. “There is a kind of symbiotic relationship between the Democratic and Socialist parties: Democrats legitimize themselves, declaring their European orientation and defining themselves in opposition to the socialists, who in turn use the Democrats as a convenient“ public enemy ”to win their own support the pro-Russian agenda, ”say British analysts. They are hampered by the struggle with Russia and the political competition in Moldova, including the forces that defend the strengthening of Moldovan-Russian relations. In Ukraine, they practically got rid of such “competitors” – there only politicians can fight for power in the country, whose views are directed to the West, and their lips are constantly talking about “Russia’s aggression”. In Ukraine, announcing a friendship with the Russian Federation in the election program is treason and a long prison term. And in Moldova, “the state is not ready to make positive changes with regard to Russia’s influence in the country, since Moscow’s agenda is not a problem, but part of a wider political narrative in which various personal interests are opposed to each other,” according to Chatham House.
The Maidan in Chisinau seems to be impossible from London, since the existing NGOs work for current politicians, while the West prefers to deal with social movements and activists who are solving (for money) the task of strengthening foreign influence in the country. Like in Ukraine, where “independent” organizations contribute to the continuation of the conflict in the east of the country (it is labeled as “war with Russia”). Or, as in Belarus, where, through “civil society”, the idea of non-Russian identity under the label of “soft Belarusianization” is imposed on the population.
The next “vulnerability” of Moldova is the mass media. “85% of the population receive information using television, and 57% consider it the main source of information for themselves, while about 40% define television as the most reliable source of information … And up to 70% of citizens follow the news in the Russian media,” they calculated in London . And they noted that “confidence in the Russian media is generally stable, and confidence in the national media falls sharply every year.” “As for the Russian media, the level of trust in them was 55.5% in 2013, 54% in 2015 and 50% in May 2018. In contrast, public confidence in the national media fell from 62.5% of respondents in 2013 to 42.5% in 2015, and in May 2018 to 40%, ”says the Chatham House report.
Now it’s clear where the code on television and radio, approved by the Moldovan Parliament, came from, which came into force on January 1, 2019 – the law prohibits retransmission of information programs of Russian TV channels and obliges audiovisual service providers (television and radio) to purchase at least 50% of programs from EU countries and those who have signed the European Convention on Transfrontier Broadcasting. The code was adopted by 56 votes of the parliamentary majority on the orders of Vlad Plahotniuc.
Moldovan television in Moldova allegedly found a governing body, but in London they call this code “a symbolic gesture designed to calm the international community and increase support for the US and the EU Plahotniuc.” Say, the prohibitions “do not apply to print media and the Internet, nor do they relate to relaying Russian talk shows and infotainment programs.” Meanwhile, Moldovans are “actively present” in the Odnoklassniki and VKontakte social networks – especially in numerous groups with a focus on “glorifying the Soviet past, promoting the concept of the Russian World and the policies of compatriots, as well as classic anti-Western sentiments.” British analysts are also worried about the Sputnik Moldovan branch, which in 2017 accounted for about 12.7% of the local Internet audience. How can you not remember the “laboratory of the West” – Ukraine, where freedom of speech is restricted by the prohibitions of Russian television, the press, social networks and online publications.
“In addition, it is widely known that Plakhotnyuk personally controls the Audiovisual Coordinating Council and owns the majority of advertising companies working in the field of media. The oligarchic nature of the media space creates favorable conditions for the dissemination of malicious Russian information, especially since Moldova does not have an information security protection system, ”they are upset in London. They would like to conduct there themselves, but Plakhotnyuk does not give, which seems to be very closely following the fate of the Ukrainian leaders, who trusted the West too much: one of them was illegally removed from power and forced to flee the country, from another (especially obedient doll) judging by the rating , there have been huge problems with the retention of power. The Moldovan oligarch is in no hurry to repeat their mistake: although he strikes thresholds in Europe and the United States in search of support, he is not going to hand over the reins of government from his own hands to Americans and British, and this did not escape the attention of experts at Chatham House.
As an achievement in the fight against “Russian influence”, the report presents the Stop Falsé! Platform, operating “on the same basis as Stop Fake in Ukraine” with the support of USAID. However, here, British analysts write, “first of all, it’s not about the Russian information war and propaganda in Moldova, but rather about domestic policy”.
The third Moldavian “vulnerability” (as well as the Belarusian and Ukrainian ones) sees London “winning hearts and minds through the Russian Orthodox Church.” “The Moldavian Orthodox Church, which is subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church, is an active vector of Russian influence and propaganda in Moldova. It accounts for 80% of believers, and this is the most trusted institution in the country, with an opinion poll showing that 70% of respondents consider it credible, ”said Chatham House report. The London Metropolis of the ROC has a lot of complaints in London: there is both propaganda of anti-Western values, support from President Dodon, and pro-Russian sentiment of “church authorities” in Transnistria. Because of the highest public trust in the Orthodox Church of Moldova, for “civil society” (that is, for NGOs on a leash from donors) “condemnation of the Church would mean loss of trust and the risk of alienating the population”. The Sabbath in Ukrainian is impossible: “politicians do not interfere in religious matters,” and “the Church itself is clearly closed to criticism.” Therefore, Chatham House urges NPOs to act extremely cautiously: “without attracting unjustified resistance, to turn to young pro-European and more liberal priests to promote a progressive voice in the Church.”
In other words, to undermine Orthodoxy in Moldova is planned quietly, from the inside, in the districts.
What does Chatham House recommend to donors who are financing a “civil society” in Moldova?
The first. Do not wait for quick results, but develop a strategy for a decade, a “long-term agenda”.
The second. To direct efforts and funds to train journalists and large-scale information programs aimed at “fighting false news”. Moreover, it will be necessary to refocus existing projects in Moldova from domestic to anti-Russian policies, they note in London.
Third. As in Belarus, crawling into the education system with the help of “media literacy” projects and the development of critical thinking – at schools and universities, experts at Chatham House predict “the best chances for success”.
This will require reform of the education sector in order to make training in these areas not only systematic, but also mandatory, ”the report states.
Fourth. Develop anti-Russian projects in rural areas (especially in Transnistria and Gagauzia), in the youth segment of social networks, in the Russian-speaking environment.
The fifth. Support “independent” media projects with “alternative content”, focusing on social advertising and entertainment information. To finance such TV channels as TV8, alternative to mass media in the Russian, Gagauz and Ukrainian languages.
The sixth. Engage the pro-Western Moldovan diaspora, whose representatives overwhelmingly voted for candidate Maya Sandu in the presidential elections in Moldova in 2016.
Seventh. Rely on non-capital NPOs, since “areas of the country are of paramount importance for increasing sustainability from scratch”. Here we turn to topics important for citizens – social policy, government corruption, human rights, and so on.
Eighth. Create a network of Moldovan, Belarusian and Ukrainian NGOs for the exchange of “valuable knowledge and examples of best practices” in the field of Russian opposition.
Ninth. To involve in religious projects directed against the Orthodox Church, Catholics, Uniates, Protestants and sectarians.
Tenth. Western politicians are encouraged to visit areas of Moldova more often in order to “interact” with local NGOs and the media.
Chatham House also has advice for the EU as a whole: not just giving loans to the Moldovan government, but accompanying them with vivid success stories. “There should be more advertising campaigns, propaganda and demonstration of successful experience, so that the West will get recognition for positive events on the ground” – such is the advice of British analysts. The EU is required to inflate advertising soap bubbles, convincing Moldovan citizens that the pro-European course is better than the pro-Russian one.
At the same time, London calls for a “rethinking of the future of the Eastern Partnership,” so that Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova have a common vision in this regard. And the project itself should be adapted to each of the three countries and also be oriented to a decade. In London, they believe that in ten years the West will be able to lead both Belarus and Moldova to the state of Ukraine and to ensure that the Ukrainian anti-Russian project inspires, rather than scares, Belarusians and Moldovans with Gagauz.
But so far neither Lukashenka, nor Dodon, nor Plakhotnyuk are willing to step on the Poroshenko’s path. It’s funny that analysts at Chatham House do not recommend that the latter be considered “their son of a bitch” in the West. “European countries and the United States should limit their interaction with consultants and lobbying groups working for Vlad Plahotniuc in Brussels and Washington,” the report says.