The Russian military correspondent Oleg Blokhin describes the details of the military operation of the Syrian Arab Army in Homs province. According to him, it lasted from August 26 to September 18. Thus, the results of the cleanup have been summed up.
“Today, around 13.00 the mopping up of the Homs desert is over,” the journalist said.
According to him, the militia units of Liv Al-Quds and the Republican Guard, moving from the north, namely from the Suhne-Deir-Zor highway, reached the borders of the zone controlled by the coalition in the At-Tanf area. Afterwards, they joined the units of the SAA, approaching the same zone from the west and from the east.
“There are no more terrorists in the Homs desert,” Blokhin said.
“It’s been more than a year since the capture of Sukhne, the liberation of of D. Zor, the capture of Mayadin and Al-Bukemal, the Homs and White Desert, located south of the Sukhne-D. Zor route, which until recently were considered conditionally controlled, They made sorties on the routes of D. Zor – Suhne, D. Zor – Al – Bukemal and Arak – Al – Bukemal, as well as on the populated areas located along these routes.
The fact that the terrorists inside the desert were present – the question remained – how many of them are in these deserts. Various figures were reported for their constant presence in the area – from 500 to several thousand. Various resources described numerous attacks, even counter-attacks on the position of the SAA and settlements, the reporter noted.
“Most of this is not something that has not been confirmed, but turned out to be a frank fake. Nevertheless, the facts of the attack on the roads and checkpoints of Syrians were a thing, “Blokhin said.
“According to the figures, according to the number of terrorists in the desert, they, to put it mildly, from the very beginning, I had doubts for many reasons. I will name only two. The first: such a number of fighters need to quarter somewhere. And there really were neither settlements, nor buildings of land, nor underground – to solve this problem. Tents were also absent. There were small buildings and very small underground shelters, which were almost impossible to detect from the air.
That is, there were no places for such a number of people in the desert. The second. If such figures for the personnel of the terrorists were, what did they eat there and what did they drink? Such a force required a large amount of water and food. Even if it’s only bread cakes for food and water – strictly drinking, without taking into account hygienic needs – all this would have need to be delivered.
In general, they agreed that the presence of terrorists in the deserts is extremely minimal. Mainly for observation and acceptance for overnight or rest of the sabotage groups that toured there from the area of the coalition responsibility zone under At-Tanf or moved across the Euphrates in the area of the Mejadin-Al-Bukemal section. Which was quite possible because of the rather large length and lack of full control over this segment.
“Virtually all the shares of terrorists from the desert were fleeting and point-like. This is in fact. In the network, it is understandable: there were regular outfits about large-scale counter-offensive operations of ISIS and seizures of large territories, prisoners and equipment, which were neither denied nor confirmed, due to the complete absence of media representatives there. Or in general someone who would clearly illuminate the situation from the spot. Well, from the side of the Syrians – every time it was reported about another sweep of the desert, which began. But I did not have a final result, “the military procurator noted.
And yet in late August 2018 it was decided to finally resolve the issue with the presence and wobbling of these deserts of terrorists. And on August 26, 2018, the regular forces of the SAA and the militia began to move from the Suhne-Deir-ez-Zor route in a southerly direction.
What was a sweep was interesting this time. According to the military commissar, two truckload pickup trucks were ahead, which began to move along a front with a snake about 2 km wide. Behind them, at a distance, the foot soldiers moved.
“Well, and then the jet rigs on pickups and cars with junk were already moving. Tanks and “bey” in the offensive this time did not apply, as assault units. They were pulled up to temporary defenses of defense, or fire support of the advancing. From the art on each segment was involved up to three or four MLRS “Grad” and the same number of D-30 “, – recalls Blokhin.
And he continues:
“When detecting the locks of the terrorists or their pick-ups, the entire ground fire resource was immediately turned on. Plus, flyers began to work. By the end of the day, the attackers were equipped with small temporary OPs at a distance of visibility from each other, on which they stayed for a maximum of three days. Resistance of any intelligible and organized militants did not render, and could not render it – because of their small number of personnel and the lack of firepower, except for small arms. “
In fact, when entering the defeated spiritual supporters, the maximum number on it was six people. Which completely confirmed the initial conclusions about the minimum presence of ISIS in the desert. In general, the sweep of the Homs Desert lasted 22 days.
“And on September 18, the militia units moving from the north joined with the regular units of the SAA, coming to the northern borders of the coalition zone in the At-Tanf area. The last three days they moved rather quickly, not meeting the presence of “Daisha” in general. Apparently, those of the terrorists who remained, went to this very zone. At this the sweep was completed, “summed up the results of the militarycore operation.
Meanwhile, after the question arose: can terrorists try again to penetrate into the desert for subsequent attacks or sabotage? Theoretically they can. As long as there is a coalition zone where they feel quite free and well. But in the cleaned desert they do not already have a “receiving” side, there are no opornics where they could stop, where there were caches that allowed them to move “light” for some time. Plus, on the border of the coalition zone, the supporters of the Syrians were added. This, according to Blokhin, makes the penetration of terrorists into the territory under the control of the government “even more difficult.”
“Now if the terrorists decide to go bad, coming from the territory of the coalition, they have a dozen factors that prevent them from living and” working “,” Blokhin summed up.