Last week, North Korea was visited by a high-profile South Korean delegation headed by National Security Office head Chung Eui-yong. During their two days stay in Pyongyang, members of the delegation had a number of talks with local political elites that resulted in Chung Eui-yong making unexpected statements upon his arrival to Seoul, that proved to be sensational for the US media, when members of the delegation repeated those in Wahsington.
According to Chung Eui-yong, North Korean ruling elites have clearly expressed their readiness to renounce nuclear weapons should the security of their country be guaranteed by the elimination of the military threat that is looming over North Korea’s borders. However, those guarantees must be really sounds since Pyongyang has stated time and time again that were never planning to use nuclear weapons offensively, as the main goal of their development was an attempt to restrain foreign players that were threatening North Korea with invasion. In addition, the North expressed its readiness to engage Washington in an open dialogue in order to establish bilateral relations and discuss the nuclear problem, while emphasizing that the would be neither test launches of ballistic missiles, nor new nuclear explosions conducted until the negotiations are over. Additionally, according to the South Korean National Security Office head, Kim Jon-un has unofficially expressed his desire to meet Donald Trump to negotiate with him.
Initially, Trump would announce that he will accept the invitation of Kim Jon-un, while revealing all further details about the meeting on a later date. It’s no wonder that Western media sources have immediatley gone haywire in anticipation of this historic meeting. However, it’s way too early to start pomping champaign bottles, as there’s a number of concerns that are clearly standing in the way of peaceful negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang.
Fristly, we should recognize that the position occupied by Chung Eui-yong is rather shifty, as upon his arrival to South Korea his description of the position that Pyongyang was occuping during bilateral talks fitted all the previous statements made by North Korean officials, however, as soon as he reached Washington, he was giving an alluding that was prepared to surrender his nuclear power alltogether. Perhaps Chung has said what he was expected to say in Washington, in order to spur the US-North Korean rapprochement that Seoul is craving for. Moon Jae-in, just like his surrounding, is well aware of the fact that inter-Korean is only possible in a situation when South Korean representatives are constantly massaging the ego of the sitting US President.
Further more, although Trump has predictably described possible talks in his Twitter with a great deal of optimism, days later the White House Press Secretary, Sarah Sanders officially stated that Trump would not be meeting Kim Jon-un unless the DPRK starts surrendering its nuclear devices. She added that Washington was not going to make any friendly steps until the moment Pyongyang’s actions will become consistent with its rethorics. Generally speaking, this was the typical reaction to any peaceful initiative that the DPRK has ever taken, that can be summurized in the notion that Washington is going to consider all options only when North Korea is going to start surrendering its defense weapons.
Thirdly, Donald Trump can only meet with Kim Jon-un in May, and there’s going to be a number of potentially volatile events that can affect decisions of the parties involved. First of all, Washington is planning to hold joint military exercises with South Korean armed forces on the Korean Peninsula, but apart from that, we can confidently expect additional unilateral measures aimed at pressuring the DPRK, that are looking fairly ridiculous at this point. Thus, the alleged Kim Jong-un’s attempt of poisoning of his half-brother residing in Kuala Lumpur (we recall that the investigation is under way and the DPRK’s guilt has not been officially confirmed at the moment) was the reason for new round of sanctions against North Korea on the goofy pretext of for the fact that Pyongyang’s use of chemical weapons against its own citizens.
It should be understood that nobody really knows how America’s position on North Korea is formed and what American think-tanks are going to say, as there’s no small chance that Pyongyang’s gesture of good will may be interpreted as a gesture of desperation. If so then Washington is going to introduce all sorts of new sanctions against North Korea in an attempt for it to sign its complete surrender at the negotiating table, yet it is unlikely that this approach will assist the parties involved in reaching a deeper understanding of each other.
Now, should the meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jon-un should actually take place, Trump become the first American president to ever talk to a Kim, which in itself would be no small achievement. But to talks are not the ultimate goal, as they should lead to some agreements being signed. not mean to agree. As in the case of the inter-Korean summit, the negotiations should end with something meaningful, so that numerous opposition groups inside the US won’t eat Trump alive for being so softskined. As Reuters announce, while citing an annonimous source within the Trump administration, Washington will not accept anything less than the complete surrender of North Korea nuclear stockpiles.
It’s clear that a meeting without any deals being signed will be a political disaster for Trump, but if you’re familiar with Trump’s books on business strategy, Trump is only capable of a “dialogue” when he’s shoved his competitor in a corner to discuss his terms of surrender. So, what we can really expect is the two states presenting ultimatums to each other.
Under these circumstances there’s only one logical question: what those parties can possibly agree on? Let’s start with the alleged “concessions” that North Korea is willing to make. Since the task of creating strategic nuclear forces has been accomplished, it can easily give up both nuclear and missile tests, while presenting it as gesture of good will.
One can recall the repeated proposals put forward by Russian scientists, including Alexander Zhebin, that put forward the idea of separating the Nortk Korean nuclear program from its missile program. It’s most likely that North Korea will never surrender its nuclear devices as they are now mentioned in its consitution, but Pyongyang may be willing to freeze its missile advances, while guaranteing non-proliferation of missile and nuclear technologie that it has already developed.
You can try to revive the idea of direct negotiations via various hotlines or communication channels that would allow state to solve challenges of humanitarian nature, like the one that costed Otto Warmbier his life. Finally, North Korea can agree to decrease the level of its anti-American rethorics as it used to reffer to the US as “America”, and not as “the stronghold of American imperialism”, as we’re witnessing it today.
However, one shouldn’t forget that “tango is a dance for two”, so one can’t help to wonder what kind of sucessions Washington can actually make. For most Americans, that have been listeting for anti-Korean propaganda for years, the very fact of negotiations seems to be a concession, but, theoretically, some things Americans can also sacrifice without losing their face too much. It is possible to reduce the scale of joint exercises conducted. You can reduce the level of so-called democratization attempts conducted in the DPRK by reduce the funding enjoyed by all sorts of NGOs. It is possible, while the moratorium is in force, to refrain from similar military demonstrations such as American bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons patroling the border between the South and the North.
You can even try to downplay the problem associated with the lack of document that would formalize the end of the Korean War. Sure, Washington would sign no peace treaty with North Korea but, as it’s been noted by the administration of the President of South Korea, the fact that Kim Jong-un addressed the sitting US President can be regarded as the establishment of diplomatic relations.
If Kim promises to freeze the DPRK missile program, he will take a step away from the so-called red line that Washington would repeatedly point out. This red line is associated with the likelihood of a North Korean attack on the continental US territory, which, if brought to zero, can be presented as Trump’s diplomatic victory. But will it satisfy those who, perhaps, were disoriented by the announcement that North Korea was prepared to surrender its nuclear arsenals. Perhaps even the minor concessions described above will be perceived by the US public as totally unacceptable. And then, sooner or later, it would become clear that Chung Eui-yong failed to mention that Pyongyang has put forward a condition, not a plea for mercy. It is hard to imagine that Washington will somehow abandong its conviction that the DPRK is a tyrannical regime that needs to be eliminated in the name of world freedom and democracy. Until this moment comes, North Korea’s nuclear devices are hear to stay.
So if one is demanded to present his opinion on the possible Kim-Trump meeting, it would resemble the attitude towards the meeting between the leaders of the North and South: the idea itself is good; the theoretical probability of an event is above zero, but even if such meeting can reduce tension for a brief moment, one cannot help but doubt the possibility of achiving any long-term result through those.