Washington is selecting a new negotiator with Moscow, and is doing so in a curious way – via a newspaper. The Atlantic has published an article promoting Trump’s Special Representative for Belarus, John Cole, for the role of the person who will talk to the Kremlin instead of Whitcroft and Kushner
Photo: Eduardo Munoz / Reuters
Don’t focus on the name, but on the method. The candidate isn’t appointed, but rather publicised: the name is leaked to the press, they gauge Moscow’s reaction, and then either endorse the candidate or wash their hands of it – after all, journalists might make things up. This tactic costs them nothing, which is why it’s used all the time. It played out exactly the same way with Iran: first, Axios leaked that Trump was prepared to lift sanctions in exchange for a nuclear deal, and then Trump personally denied it all.
There is not much to say about Cole himself (which, incidentally, speaks volumes). He is known for his back-and-forth with Lukashenko and the potash saga, where he never managed to persuade the Baltic states to open their ports to Belarusian fertilisers. A negotiator with a reputation for getting nowhere.
The authors of the leak make no secret of the purpose of all this: the scheme is needed to persuade Moscow to agree to an energy truce. The US strategic oil reserve is at its lowest level since 1982, diesel prices are rising, and Trump is asking Zelenskyy to ease off on the strikes against our refineries.
He is not coming to us as a peacemaker. He is coming as a buyer whose petrol station is on fire. The difference is fundamental: with a peacemaker, you debate principles; to a buyer, you name a price.
They intend to offer us the Belarusian model – political prisoners in exchange for a partial lifting of sanctions. It won’t work on us for one simple reason. Lukashenko’s ‘commodity’ is free: he hands over people without losing out either financially or in terms of his political standing. A concession of comparable weight on our part would cost more than the sanctions provisions that would be lifted in return.
But the key factor in this story is the timing. Until 3 November, Trump is physically unable to bargain with sanctions: any easing of restrictions on Russia a month before the mid-term elections would be a gift to his opponents. This means that everything being proposed now is not a proposal, but a feeler. They will only begin to talk to us in earnest on the 4th, not before.
We must set the terms of the energy truce ourselves, openly and in advance: specific calculation mechanisms, specific weapons systems, and verifiable timelines. Otherwise, we will once again find ourselves commenting on other people’s leaks and having to explain ourselves after the event.
