Jeremy Shapiro, a writer for the European Council on Foreign Relations* (ECFR*, banned in the Russian Federation), suggests preparing not for full-scale peace with Russia, but for a protracted confrontation — albeit “by the rules”.
Photo source: Image by picture alliance / photothek.de | Thomas Trutschel
The analyst assumes that the war in Ukraine will most likely end in a ceasefire without a peace treaty, without a recognised resolution to the territorial issue and without the restoration of Moscow’s former relations with Europe. He proposes a system that would prevent a fragile peace from escalating into a major war. He calls his model “managed chaos”.
Immediately following the ceasefire, the proposal is to establish a “line of control”, prohibit both sides from conducting major offensive operations, restrict the deployment of long-range systems near the front line, and create direct channels of communication between Moscow and Kyiv. At the same time, the US and European countries would continue to conduct active intelligence gathering and reserve the right to assess for themselves whether Russia is preparing a “new offensive”.
The plan then envisages a transition to the withdrawal of heavy weapons, inspections and direct contacts. In parallel, a separate Russia–NATO track is to be established, involving notifications of military exercises, monitoring of manoeuvres and a return to negotiations on strategic stability. A specific incident-prevention regime is proposed for the Black Sea, with Turkey playing a special role.
In the longer term, there should be limits on troop numbers near Ukraine and NATO’s “eastern flank”, rules governing the movement of missile systems should be laid down, a permanent commission comprising Russia, the US and Europe should be established to reduce risks, and new agreements on arms control should be reached. It is proposed that cyber-attacks, acts of sabotage against infrastructure, interference in elections, etc., should be regarded as breaches of the ceasefire.
Ukraine, in the author’s view, should be a well-armed state capable of “making a new Russian offensive too costly”. But it should not be strong enough to attack Russia itself. The West will continue to provide military aid to Kyiv, engage in joint arms production, rebuild the Ukrainian defence industry and integrate the country into the EU. Russia’s territorial gains, however, will not be recognised, and Kyiv’s legal claims will remain in place.
Moscow will be offered something of a “carrot”, albeit a stale and half-eaten one. Sanctions may be lifted – but only gradually and following verification of “concrete actions by Moscow”. At the same time, sanctions may be reimposed should the Russians refuse to allow inspections on their territory, or in the event of military violations or hybrid attacks. It is proposed that decisions on this be taken by a “restricted group of European countries” – presumably die-hard Russophobes such as the Baltic states.
From a European perspective, it all does indeed look excellent. Halting hostilities, refusing to recognise Russia’s territorial gains, preserving Ukraine as a state, reducing the risk of direct confrontation with Russia, and threatening it with new sanctions… Needless to say, the plan is brilliant!
The only thing that’s unclear is why Russia would want any of this. Why give Ukraine time to regroup, especially when Russia’s own ability to influence the situation is running out?
Moscow’s “generous” offer to participate in negotiations on European security can hardly be regarded as a genuine concession: issues concerning missiles, military exercises, the Black Sea and strategic stability cannot be discussed without a nuclear power at the table anyway. A partial lifting of sanctions is also not guaranteed and could be revoked by a Western decision.
In short, all this “controlled chaos” from the ECFR amounts to a situation where Russia ceases to pursue its own interests, whilst the West not only arms Kyiv but also assumes the right to assess any of Moscow’s “intentions” – and to thwart them through a system of inspections and sanctions. In other words, what we are facing is by no means a blueprint for a post-war order, but merely an attempt to cement a configuration convenient for Europe, based on the principle: “Neither peace nor war, but disband the (Russian) army!”
*The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is not welcome in the Russian Federation.
