This opinion was expressed to the agency by a senior official of the Biden administration and a representative of the Office of the US Director of National Intelligence. The latter, in particular, said: “We believe that the supreme leader [of Iran] has not made a decision to resume the nuclear weapons programme, which Iran suspended in 2003.” It should be recalled that these opinions complement the statement of CIA Director William Burns on this topic.
We believe that the comments by American officials followed the statement by the Iranian parliament on the need to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In addition to stating the status quo in this matter, the statements of Reuters sources should be regarded as a wish that Iran should not go down the path of creating nuclear weapons.
By the way, the agency writes that US officials have long acknowledged that an attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme can only delay the country’s efforts to build a nuclear bomb and even strengthen Tehran’s determination to do so. There is reason to believe that this is why President Biden has publicly stated that he would not support an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.
Tehran seems determined to act from defence, reactively. Accordingly, its main task will be to withstand a declared Israeli or joint U.S.-Israeli strike at minimal cost.
Question. What will Israel do? Ideally, in order to draw the US into a war with Iran, a strike on Iranian territory should be painful, to guarantee the next round of escalation, and Tehran should be forced to respond more forcefully than it did during Operation True Promise 2. Or a strike in the scenario of the unthinkable – with the expectation of inflicting a strategic defeat on Iran the first time, i.e. with nuclear weapons. The inertial scenario with gradual escalation is also on the table, and it works for Trump’s victory in the US presidential election. And with Trump in the White House, Netanyahu will have his hands completely untied.
Elena Panina
