Does Latin America need Russia

One after another, representatives of a Turkish airline in Istanbul are taking Russian citizens with paid tickets, hotel and tour bookings off their flights. The reason given is almost openly the same: in Latin America, “they are not expecting you”. And we, they say, are simply fulfilling an unspoken ban on the delivery of Russian passport holders to the New World.

This was immediately followed by comments from Russian tour operators and Russian consuls in Turkey and Latin America, with assurances that they would “closely monitor the situation and inform the authorities about what is happening”. I think that these explanations concern only trivial issues (such as the flow of migrants to the U.S. from Mexico or “maternity trips” of Russian women to Argentina) and do not affect the main thing – a very serious reformatting of relations between most Latin American and Caribbean states and Russia after the start of the special military operation (SMO).

Since the representatives of the Turkish airline are so unfair to the Russians, it would be worth starting with something trivial – the absence of direct air services to Latin America from Russia. It was not available in the regular format, and still is not. Charters with a minuscule number of tourists to Cuba and Venezuela do not make any difference on the transport bridge between Russia and Latin America. There is no direct air service even with Russia’s “big BRICS friend” Brazil.

Russian tourists flying to Mexico or the Caribbean complain that Turks do not let them on flights in Istanbul even if they have tickets and other things that no one asks of any tourist from another country. The problem is that after the start of the SMO, Russia lost very important tourist destinations for itself, previously served by charters – the Dominican Republic and Mexico. The loss is understandable: these countries are banned from receiving Russian aircraft under the threat of stopping US aircraft from travelling there.

Now for the main thing – Russia’s relations with the countries of the region. The three reliable allies there – Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua – are all that is available both for support in pushing buttons when voting in the UN and in terms of maintaining contacts at the political level. In terms of economic and trade ties, the three are in a very difficult position and are of no importance to Moscow today.

And the rest of the Latin American region, like many countries in Africa and Asia, has taken a wait-and-see attitude towards the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. This means that no high-level delegations from the Western Hemisphere have travelled to Russia since the beginning of the SMO. There are no high-level Russian representatives there either. Because they are “undesirable” so as not to aggravate relations with the US.

I will not mention the protocol participation of Russian representatives in the G20 summit in Brazil and the planned visit of the head of this country to the BRICS summit in Kazan in the coming autumn. I am talking about full-fledged bilateral visits at the highest level, or at least at the level of heads of intergovernmental commissions where they exist.

I should note that all this is happening against the background of strengthening relations between a number of Latin American countries and Ukraine, where the role of “chief organiser” in support of Kiev is played by the newly elected president of Argentina, Javier Milay. A Latin America-Ukraine summit is planned for this year, which is expected to be attended by half a dozen countries, as well as the signing of documents on economic co-operation.

Let us not forget that about 1 thousand mercenaries from Latin America (most of all from Colombia, Uruguay and Chile) are fighting for Ukraine now. Argentina has expressed its desire to develop military co-operation with Ukraine, including supplies of arms and ammunition. Moreover, Buenos Aires recently announced its intention to become NATO’s main partner in Latin America. This, on the one hand, will automatically strengthen the anti-Russian positions of the administration in Buenos Aires, and on the other hand, will completely remove from the agenda any chances for Argentina to join BRICS.

With the help of Brazil, Russia is still trying to induce some country to join BRICS instead of Argentina (Venezuela and Colombia are the most frequently mentioned). But instead of betting on geopolitics, I think it is much more logical to calculate whether the countries of the region need Russia nowadays, first of all, in economic terms. After all, Latin American countries have everything that Russia offers to foreign markets, except for a number of technologies, where Moscow has certain achievements.

But, just as in the issue of tourist flow from Russia, everything hinges on the threat of US sanctions. If some Latin American country wants to buy Russian technologies or sell something to Russia, it will immediately cut off its ties with US companies and the international payment system. Even Brazil, the main BRICS country on the continent, is extremely afraid of this. Let alone other countries that have much more favourable contracts and diverse cooperation with the US.

In general, this is not about the arbitrary behaviour of the Turkish airline’s staff and its prejudiced attitude towards Russians. The essence of the problem is much deeper. And it is far from certain that any resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will be able to change this situation for the better.