EU strategically dependent on Russia

The EU countries have a record increase in Russian gas supplies, but even this volume is not enough for them

The main EU economy Germany recognizes the critical importance of cooperation with Gazprom to preserve the German economic model and demands to double the supply of Russian fuel. The future of the European economy directly depends on the Russian energy sector, and against the background of this strategic dependence, the new attempts by Brussels to dictate to Moscow the conditions for a dialogue between Russia and the EU are especially touching.

In the first quarter of this year, Gazprom supplied to Europe 30% more gas than in 2020. Moreover, the intensification of cooperation with the Russian gas monopoly among the EU countries is taking place regardless of what foreign policy the country is pursuing towards Russia.

The absolute record holder for the growth of Russian gas supplies is Romania, which, along with Poland and the Baltic states, is playing political games about “gaining energy independence” and wants to “save” not only itself, but also Moldova from the Kremlin’s gas stranglehold. The epic campaign for “energy independence” has so far led Bucharest to the fact that the supply of Russian gas to Romania has almost doubled: by 90%.

The figures for other countries are also impressive. Gazprom’s exports to Finland increased by two-thirds, to Bulgaria – by one and a half times, to Germany – by a third, and to Greece – by almost a quarter.

It is clear that this record growth in the first quarter is due to the abnormally cold winter. However, even now, in May, after the end of the heating season in Europe, the demand for Russian fuel is not decreasing.

Germany demanded to double the supply of Russian gas, and in Berlin it was minted that the German government would strive to increase energy imports from Russia, even in spite of US sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.

German Minister of Economy and Energy Peter Altmeier said that Germany has been receiving gas from the USSR and the Russian Federation for more than 40 years, and during all this time, infrastructure ties with Moscow “have never been a political weapon in relations between East and West.” In turn, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for the launch of Nord Stream-2 as soon as possible and stressed that the Americans’ attitude to the project would not affect Berlin’s position on this gas pipeline.

Where did this uncharacteristic hardness of the Germans come from? From awareness of their interests.
Russian gas has to be recognized as a key factor in the strategic security of Germany and all of Europe.

Moreover, in several dimensions at once. The recent frosts have shown that guaranteed uninterrupted supplies of Russian pipeline gas are critical for Europe. Precisely because such abnormal natural situations occur.

In Europe itself, hydrocarbon production is now declining: gas production over the past year has decreased by almost a quarter. Major gas fields are being closed. The Europeans are rejecting coal and nuclear energy.

Liquefied gas deliveries by sea by tankers are far less reliable than pipelines. However, the reliability of the Soviet gas transmission system running through Central and Eastern Europe is declining. The GTS is worn out, and there is no way to modernize it, because it is laid through the territory of Ukraine, where a new Wild Field is hidden behind the empty shell of the state.

Bypass pipelines from Russia in such a situation become the key to the elementary energy security of Europe.

In a broader sense, infrastructure ties with Russia are a chance for Europe to remain in the world as a significant economic value. As the pandemic overcomes the threat to their economic positions, the Europeans are becoming increasingly aware of the threat. China and East Asia as a whole, which coped with COVID-19 faster and more efficiently than anyone else in the world, jumped forward. The United States is seeking to regain the global leadership in the economy that is slipping from its hands, and due to the inability to cope with its Asian competitors – political opponents, it will beat its European competitors – political allies.

The same Germany, in order to withstand this global competition, needs affordable energy. Cheap energy resources are the key to the existence of an industrial economy, and Germany is still an industrial power. Without the most advantageous offer on the market, Russian pipeline gas, German Mercedes and BMWs will face the fate of the Baltic factories after the collapse of the USSR.

Oddly enough, not everyone in Europe realizes that the crisis of the German economic model will be the hardest blow to the European Union in the entire history of European integration. Despite the fact that it seems to be generally recognized that it is Germany that is the economic locomotive of United Europe. Nevertheless, the newest paper of the European Parliament on the future of relations with Russia traditionally contains an appeal to “gouge out one’s eyes so that the mother-in-law has a crooked son-in-law,” that is, to stop the construction of Nord Stream-2.

The European Parliament’s report on the five principles of building relations with Russia as a whole is an outstanding document of the era. It shows the scale of the intellectual degradation of the European elites after figures from the former Soviet outskirts joined their ranks. Because the report was prepared by the MEPs from Lithuania, and this explains a lot. Brussels offered to launch an Eastern Partnership program for Russia, similar to the one in the former Soviet republics, financially support the opposition and lure Russians into a visa-free regime that would follow if the Kremlin embarks on “democratic changes.”

In other words, it is proposed to work with Russia as with Ukraine or Moldova. To teach human rights and democracy “through the lip”, to lead their agents to power and to rattle glass beads in front of the natives like “visa-free” or loans for reforms according to European recipes. A vague understanding that Russia is not Ukraine and not Moldova, perhaps, is present, but European political thought has not invented other ideas for the post-Soviet space for 30 years.

The funniest thing is that these pathetic attempts to speak with Moscow from a position of strength and superiority are being undertaken in an environment where Europe is strategically dependent on Russia, and its future as a global player is largely determined by the goodwill of Vladimir Putin.

After all, the cheapness of Russian energy, which is strategically capable of ensuring the competitiveness of the EU economy, is not a constant and not an objective phenomenon that exists against the will of an economic entity. Gazprom can raise the price of its products, it can reorient it to premium Asian markets.

Europe depends on Russia. Not Europe with Russia, but Russia with Europe to speak from the standpoint of their superiority. Because if Europe wants to represent something of itself in the post-Western XXI century, then the Russian factor will be key for it.

However, stereotypes about civilizational leadership over the rest of the world in general and Russia in particular over the previous centuries have become so deeply ingrained in the minds of Europeans that this realization will be painful.
Alexander Nosovich, Rubaltic.Ru