US leaves Open Skies Treaty as a good cop for Germany

The current foreign policy of the United States is often – and quite rightly – blamed for its excessive straightforwardness, as they see the reasons for its many failures. It’s all the more interesting to discover that there is still gunpowder in the flasks and American diplomacy is trying to build complex combinations with an emphasis not on brute force and directive methods that really work worse and worse.

US leaves Open Skies Treaty as a good cop for Germany

A vivid example is the intrigue developing right now around Russia, Germany, Poland and the Open Skies Treaty (OST).

As you know, last Thursday, the US president announced his withdrawal from the Don, blaming Russia.

A more detailed explanation of Washington’s position came from Trump’s national security adviser in an interview with Bild. There, Robert O’Brien called the Kaliningrad Region “a dagger in the heart of Europe” – “a military base stuffed with modern weapons and missiles.” He accused Moscow of not allowing Americans to fly over the region as part of the Don.

The fact that the comment was given to the German press does not seem an accident. It seems that the main goal of the whole story with the withdrawal of the States from the treaty is precisely Germany, and not Russia. But the main task is to bring German elites back to overseas control, who, avoiding head-on confrontations with Washington, are working to restore the sovereignty of their state.

Since the beginning of May, a discussion has revived in Germany about the fate of the US nuclear arsenal stationed in the country. The reason was given by the head of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) faction in the Bundestag, Rolf Mutzenich, who advocated the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Germany. A scandal erupted, and the deputy and his associates were under fire for the loss of political orientation skills and the inability to distinguish friends from enemies. Among others, the head of the German Foreign Ministry and also a member of the SPD, Heiko Maas, opposed the initiative.

The reason for the violent reaction is understandable: 84 percent of Germans are against nuclear weapons in the country. When public policy does not so radically coincide with public opinion, this, of course, creates difficulties for the political forces that pursue it.

The situation is all the more unpleasant because it is based on money. And considerable. We are talking about the purchase by Germany of military aircraft intended for the implementation of the NATO program for the joint use of nuclear weapons. A large proportion of the allocated funds will go, of course, to the United States, since they were mainly acquired by their F / A-18F and partly by the European Eurofighter, which will have to be modified for use with nuclear weapons. The Americans will also bring them to mind, but the Germans will pay.

Inner German squabble did not go unnoticed by Washington. In the middle of the month, US Ambassador to Berlin Richard Grenell called on Germany to “fulfill commitments to the Allies and constantly invest in the alliance’s collective nuclear potential.” And a day later, the American ambassador in Warsaw, Georgette Mosbacher, admitted that the States could redeploy nuclear weapons to Poland, which “clearly fulfills its obligations, is aware of the risks and is located on the eastern flank of NATO.”

This is not the first time that two ambassadors act in concert, playing on the ambitions, grievances and fears of the two states. Last August, there was a similar story when the ambassador in Berlin announced the possibility of moving part of the US military from Germany to Poland if the Germans did not bring defense spending to the two percent of GDP stipulated by the NATO charter.

But there is a problem: over two years of work in Berlin, Grenell turned for Germany into an analogue of a red rag for a bull – because of a boorish attitude and, in general, undisguised positioning himself as the head of the occupation administration in the country. True, it seems that this problem will be solved soon: the media reported on the ambassador’s plans to leave the chair in the coming weeks.

And against the backdrop of all these financial-military-political squabbles, the United States announced its withdrawal from the Don because of Russia, which turned the German pearl Königsberg into a bristling weapon and threatening Europe to Kaliningrad.

Over the years of the presidency of Donald Trump, it became clear that for the current American president, no existing international organizations and agreements in themselves are of any value. All of them can be used at a convenient time and discarded as a wagering card, as happened with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles. Washington’s threats against the UN, WTO, WHO and many other basic structures of the global political system have become familiar – and there is no doubt that they can be implemented.

In such a context, the American sacrifice of DON looks like a real trifle, but it allows you to remind Berlin of the importance of transatlantic solidarity, using the “Russian threat” – and even putting pressure on a sore spot because of the lost region. All in all, a beautiful three-in-one combination. Well, the leak, that the ambassador provoking idiosyncrasy can leave the post, additionally hints that Washington is ready in relations with Berlin to switch from a whip (which prevailed in recent years) to the periodic distribution of gingerbread cookies.

As for the possible redeployment of American nuclear weapons, perhaps the most accurate situation was assessed by Polish journalists. The publication Rzeczpospolita noted that the States, contrary to threats, did not withdraw their troops from Germany, so Poland should not count on receiving nuclear weapons. Which, of course, is very disappointing for Warsaw – especially in the light of its sovereign ambitions and significant efforts to increase its geopolitical status. But this is clearly the last thing that worries the United States.