We are publishing a fragment of an interview with Nikita Bondarev on the Creative Diplomacy project, where he described the strength of the common historical memory and how Russia uses it in the Balkans.

KD:  There is an opinion in Brussels that Russia has some kind of top-secret and comprehensive strategy regarding the Balkans, and Russian experts often say that Russia does not have a clearly defined Balkan strategy, and the Balkan countries feel ignorant of the Russian position . Where is the truth?  

Nikita Bondarev:  Of course, it is common for the West to demonize us to some extent, and this cannot be discounted. The doubt “are these Russians not fooling us?” Is always present. What confuses them? We use one special resource of soft power, which Western countries – mainly the USA and Great Britain – cannot use, because they are not very clear and accessible to them, and we use it in our “somnambulistic” state. This is about “The power of historical memory.” 

She brings us certain political dividends. Due to the historical features of development in the US toolbox, the “strength of historical memory” is simply absent. The USA, by European standards, is a young state; moreover, for a significant part of its history, the USA acted in the mainstream of isolationism. Yes, in connection with the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson tried to bring the state to the world stage. Then a surge of activity occurred during the Second World War, after which the United States has continuously remained a participant in international relations. But on the whole, the history of US relations with the same Balkan region is very short – essentially only post-war, and at the same time contradictory. 

Earlier examples of productive US relations with the Western Balkans can be counted on the fingers of one hand. So, the American philanthropist Andrew Carnegie in Europe, who suffered after the First World War, built libraries. A large modern library was built, including in Belgrade, for which the Serbs were very grateful. And then during World War II this building was bombed, and nothing was built in its place: now it’s just a wasteland. This example could be used as a precedent, talking about the politics of the power of historical memory. Something good was done, but now there is nothing to remember, since the library is no longer there. But there are memories of how Russia once did something good in a large-scale sense for Serbia, Bulgaria or Greece. People remember this, it’s important for them, 

Serbia is a good example in this regard. For the Serbian national identity, the history of the First World War, when the personal intervention of Emperor Nicholas II helped prevent the collapse of Serbian statehood and save the Serbian king, government and army, is extremely important. This is actually remembered to this day, not to mention the fact that Russia was drawn into the First World War precisely because of allied relations with Serbia. Of course, the war was inevitable, but it could start about five months later, which would be important for us. This is not to say that everyone here knows and remembers this story well, but in Serbia this is as much a part of national identity as the battle on the Kosovo field, for example. 

As a result, we managed to fix, emphasize and link this fragment of historical memory with modernity when, for example, in Belgrade, we erected a monument to Nicholas II. 

In Belgrade, the tradition of putting ceremonial European-style monuments on a pedestal is generally not very developed. The monument was erected at the place where the embassy of the Russian Empire was located, then for a short time – the Soviet embassy, ​​and then this building was also bombed. In this wasteland, in front of the presidential palace and the city hall, a monument was erected. A place in the city center, a very historical one, watered with the blood of Russian soldiers during the Second World War, is completely no coincidence. A nonrandom monument to a nonrandom person in a nonrandom place really works to enhance historical memory, recalls traditional Russian-Serbian friendship. 

Now it is not just a monument, but a real platform for political expression and a symbol of the pro-Russian vector of development. The episode with the former US vice president Joe Biden, who, having seen this monument at the presidential palace during his visit to Belgrade, became indignant and said that this contradicts the aspirations of Serbia as a country with a European development vector. And such an effect is beneficial for Russia. 

KD:  It seems that in humanitarian terms, Russia mainly works with its traditional partner, Serbia, and the rest of the Balkan countries are left to the European Union and the United States. Why does Russia pay little humanitarian attention to other Balkan countries?  

Nikita Bondarev: I would not say that they are completely surrendered. With Bulgaria, for example, a little more complicated. In Bulgaria, the power of historical memory works very well, but it is also used in an unconscious mode. So, for Bulgaria, the memory of the liberation from the Ottoman yoke of 1877-1878, the memory of the many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers and volunteers who died for the freedom of Bulgaria … remains very important. Accordingly, how can we maintain this memory and link it with the current stage in the development of Russian-Bulgarian relations? 

There are Bulgarian non-governmental organizations, such as the Movement of Bulgarian Russophiles, headed by Nikolai Malinov, which regularly update and restore the monuments, support the monuments of World War II. The history of Bulgaria during World War II, of course, is not about friendship, however, it is also an element of historical memory and Russian-Bulgarian friendship. There is also the famous monument to Alyosha in Plovdiv, a song about which they still sing. This is not just a monument, it is an instantly recognizable symbol of Plovdiv. He, too, needs to be maintained in good condition, try to make sure that the Bulgarians do not forget, and that we ourselves remember. 

In the case of Bulgariathe force of historical memory of the times of the USSR works better (whereas with Yugoslavia it was a difficult period). Relations with Bulgaria were very tight: for example, many Bulgarians were educated in the Soviet Union. In this regard, Bulgaria has particularly close ties with the Republic of Komi, where the Bulgarians went to work in the forest to earn money, earning a year or two a lot of money for a car, an apartment and were very satisfied with returning from Komi. There is even a friendship society between Bulgaria and the Komi Republic; about 20 thousand people gather at various congresses of Bulgarian Russophiles every year, of which about half are Bulgarians who used to work in Komi. They even wear T-shirts with the emblem of Komi, etc. How many people do we have who are engaged in Russian public diplomacy in the Balkans and are aware of this history of Bulgaria’s special relations with the Komi Republic? No one knows. In Syktyvkar, for example, there are streets named after the Bulgarian heroes of the liberation movement. They all remember this and are glad to see delegations from Bulgaria. Such nuances you just need to know, they can be wisely used. 

However, there is a negative aspect: from our side in the Soviet period there was always a certain paternalistic element in relations with Bulgaria as with another Union republic, which formally is not, but is considered to be Soviet. They said: “Chicken is not a bird, Bulgaria is not a foreign country”, although initially before the First World War they said that about Poland. “The Bulgarian elephant is the best friend of the Russian elephant”, “little brothers” and other slightly mocking sayings the Bulgarians terribly dislike. Of course, they understand when a person says it completely sincerely and does not put a negative, but in general they really do not like the appeal of the “brother”. 

Again, in Bulgaria there are a large number of people who know Russian well, studied with us, perfectly understand the Russian mentality, and at the same time they do not like Russia and Russians precisely for this patronizing attitude, for the fact that we look down on them. Now they are striving to find their place in the friendly family of European peoples, hoping for equal treatment. Nevertheless, there is such a phenomenon in Bulgaria – a phenomenon of people who know Russia well and are Russophobic at the same time. 

In Serbiathis is not the case, since those Serbs who did not want to go to Russia freely traveled to the West to study. With respect to Serbia, Russia did not have such paternalism, since relations with the former Yugoslavia were not as close as with socialist Bulgaria. In the case of the Bulgarians, one first has to overcome their wariness: will this person from Moscow tell us that we are “brothers”, younger brothers? Bulgarians love it when they recall that after Baptism, education and enlightenment came to Russia largely from Bulgaria, Bulgarian priests came to Russia and taught us when they remember the names of Gregory Tsamblak, Pakhomiy Logofet, Metropolitan Cyprian and others. Again – you need to know! In this case, the prejudice is immediately removed. This is also an option to use the power of historical memory. 

Now about  Greece . There is no negative paternalistic factor of the times of the USSR, since we looked at Greece as a full-fledged part of the Western capitalist world. From the perspective of historical memory, there is much in common: we can recall the Greek Queen Olga Konstantinovna Romanova, who did a lot for Greece, and the first ruler of independent Greece, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire, John Kapodistrias. The first attempt to create a modern democratic state in Greece back in the 19th century is directly related to the names of Russian political figures, which should not be forgotten either. General religious traditions do not work so accurately, a lot depends on the particular person with whom you are trying to make contact. 

First President of Greece John Kapodistrias

As a rule, Greek traditionalists are not very good with Russia, although there are, of course, exceptions. In Russia, in the first place, they see the successor of the USSR, to whom they are frankly ill. There was a negative page in the general history when a guerrilla war continued in Greece, in which the USSR actively participated, supporting local communist partisans, as a result of the losers. Thus, they look at Russia through the prism of the USSR, which in this case is disadvantageous to us. Political leftists love Russia in Greece, but it’s useless to talk with them about Orthodoxy, traditions and anything older than 1917 and comrade Lenin. Nevertheless, it is quite possible to talk about good relations between the USSR and Greece: Greece, for example, actively traded with the USSR. In general, in Greece you need to understand with whom exactly are you dealing. If you look for a Russophile in Greece, then most likely you get to the left Russophile. Of course, we cannot get a particularly significant impact on public opinion and political processes, like in Serbia or Bulgaria, using the resource of historical memory, in Greece. 

If we talk about non-Orthodox Balkan countries, for example, Croatia, Bosnia, then Russia tried to get in touch with Bosnian Muslims, but it did not work out very well. There is a good groundwork for relations with Croatia, there are Russophiles in the country, but also mostly left-wingers. You can deal with them, but such a force of historical memory here, of course, is not observed. However, we can recall that one of the first Russian historians and ideologists of soft power was a scientist of Croatian origin Yuri Krizhanich (Croatian Juraj Krizanic). This is a very interesting story: Krizhanich came to Moscow during the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, being a Catholic missionary, he was going to drag Russia into the Union with the Vatican. He was sent to Siberia, where he radically changed his views, began to write essays that Russia should unite Slavic peoples around itself, that it was necessary to create a single Slavic language based on Russian, etc. 

Yuri Krizhanich

 I also perceive Hungary as a Balkan country. In Hungary, the memory of the suppression of the uprising in 1956 is strong, and the history of serious resistance of the Hungarians of the Soviet army during the Second World War: the Soviet army fought more bloody for Vienna than for Vienna. The strength of historical memory with Hungary can serve us poorly. 

The approach in this case needs a very selective approach: in the Balkans, the strength of historical memory works very well, in the post-Soviet space it also works well, and in countries such as Poland, you do not even need to try to use the resource of strength of historical memory for objective reasons. 

Unfortunately, relations between the structures of the humanitarian sphere and the petty struggle for ideas and experts are constantly being clarified in Russia.

” KD”:  What is the strategy of the EU towards Serbia’s soft power? Has it changed against the backdrop of worsening EU relations with Russia over the past 5 years?There is a feeling that the policy of Brussels is mainly to create anti-Russian sentiment.  

Nikita Bondarev: The EU had a certain unified strategy from the beginning, but it was rather rude and clumsy, conditionally “join the EU and everything will be fine.” And now even such a strategy is bursting at the seams against the backdrop of ever greater contradictions between Germany and France on the one hand, and between Europe and the USA on the other. In the Balkans, this is especially evident, because, for example, on the Kosovo issue, France and Germany have completely different positions. The French believe that the problem needs to be solved, and if it is solved by exchanging territories between the Serbs and Albanians, then why not, if only to remove political tension. The German Foreign Ministry and the political class as a whole are categorically against the exchange of territories and speak of the recognition of territories within their existing borders, fearing the precedent and exacerbation of issues in Bosnia between Serbs and Croats, Croats and Slovenes, etc. Croatia is Germany’s beloved brainchild in the Balkans, the main partner and promoter of interests, Croatia will not be offended. Accordingly, for Germany, such an option in Kosovo is not acceptable. 

Thus, more and more internal contradictions between the leaders of different European states in connection with the Balkans are manifested, not to mention Spain, Greece, Romania, which for internal reasons do not recognize the independence of Kosovo. 

In short, there is currently no single pan-European strategy for Serbia.

Recall the recent visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Belgrade (ended July 16, 2019). The background is very interesting.

When the anniversary of the end of World War I in Paris last year was celebrated, there was a scandal over the meeting between President Putin and Kosovo President Hashim Thachi. This was the first meeting of the Russian president with a representative of the Kosovo-Albanian leaders, greeting and exchange of on-duty phrases. But in order for this to happen, Tachi, the leader of a state formation unrecognized by many states of the world, was put on the same rostrum with the leaders of the countries that won the First World War, with Russia, England and others. At the same time, the Serbian President Vučić was pushed to the podium along with representatives of countries that did not participate in the war. And this despite the fact that not a single European country suffered such damage during the war, as happened with Serbia: three-quarters of the male population of Serbia then died. Of course, 

The French press the next day issued very critical articles against Macron, since Serbia has always been a consistent ally of France. Returning to the topic of monuments, in Belgrade there is a monument to Serbian-French friendship with the inscription “France, which we love just as she loved us.” In no other capital of such a monument and expressions of friendship can not be found, and Vuchich acted very ugly. It got to the point that the French ambassador to Serbia formally apologized to the Serbian leadership, President Macron also apologized in a personal conversation with Vučić. And now, the French president arrived in Belgrade, and apparently to compensate for last year’s scandalous story, in the Kalemegdan park near the monument to Serbian-French friendship, President Macron spoke from the rostrum in Serbian, “reading” from the monument the inscription “France, which we love … “. When the leader of the largest European state speaks in the language of a small European nation, this is more than remarkable. Thus, we can say that he corrected the previous failure. As here it was not filled with a friendly attitude towards France. 

French President Emmanuel Macron in Belgrade

The French do not use the power of historical memory in the same way as we do. They have something to remember in terms of a joint past with Serbia. In the years 1920-1930. Yugoslavia didn’t have such close and close relations with anyone as with France, and the French did a lot of really good things for Serbia during this historical period. Oddly enough, even the Napoleonic campaigns in the Balkans are more likely regarded as something good. The history of relations between Serbia and France is very favorable. 

The Germans are not as successful as President Macron now, but I must say that they have less historical memory resources than France. Actually, in the First and Second World War, Serbia and Germany fought against each other, and historically Germany supported the Bulgarians more than the Serbs. 

In short, there is currently no single pan-European strategy for Serbia.