In the wake of recent Israeli airstrikes against the T-4 airbase in Syria and the shooting down of an Israeli F-16 fighter in February, Iranian-Israeli tensions have been escalating. On April 26, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis spoke of the possibility of direct clashes between the two sides. And on the night of May 9, a rocket barrage was launched from Syrian territory, targeting Israeli positions in the Golan Heights.
At such a delicate moment, when the risk of miscalculation and confrontation is growing, it is essential that policymakers in Washington gain a clearer understanding of Iran’s goals in Syria, which are not offensive but focus on deterring Israel and other major foreign stakeholders in Syria.
Misconceptions on Iran’s strategic intentions could lead to military confrontation and an escalatory cycle — especially on the heels of U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear agreement.
Rather than provoking military confrontation with Israel, Iran’s actions in Syria are first and foremost about preserving the Syrian government as part of the “axis of resistance”Rather than provoking military confrontation with Israel, Iran’s actions in Syria are first and foremost about preserving the Syrian government as part of the “axis of resistance” — a longstanding alliance between Iran, Syria and others.
Iran is also seeking to establish a balance of power — including deterrence — with other regional and international actors with interests in Syria.
For the Israelis, Iran’s military buildup is intolerable, as it crosses their red line of preventing permanent Iranian military bases in Syria. According to this interpretation of events, the objective of Iran’s Syria campaign is to expand its conventional power projection and military installations beyond its borders with the goal of destroying Israel.
While some Iranian elites may share that goal, the prevailing Israeli view on Iran’s Syrian presence misreads actual Iranian objectives and Tehran’s current prioritization of interests in Syria.
This view also fails to take seriously the limitations Iran faces in Syria, especially the very real reluctance of the Syrian and Russian governments to allow Iran to have formal military installations inside the country. It readily assumes Syria has no say in how it manages its relations with Iran because of its weakness, when the reality on the ground is much more complicated.
Broader power politics involving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Russia, Israel, and the international community actually constrain Iran’s Syria policy. The dominant narrative simultaneously portrays both an expanding Iran that is confrontational and a passive Iran that will not retaliate if attacked. Both of these perceptions are potentially dangerous, especially if they underestimate Iran’s response to potential military attacks.
While Iran and its partners are staunchly anti-Israel, provoking a military standoff with Israel is not an Iranian priorityWhile Iran and its partners are staunchly anti-Israel, provoking a military standoff with Israel is not an Iranian priority, according to our analysis.
Instead, Iran is looking to consolidate its hard-won position in the power competition between the main stakeholders in the Syrian conflict: Turkey, the United States, and the Syrian government, along with their respective allies. Syria provides Iran with vital strategic depth, allowing it to project power through the Levant, and gives it a gateway to Hezbollah, enhancing Iranian deterrence of Israel.
The collapse of the Assad regime and the dismemberment of the Syrian state would have dealt a significant blow to Iran with the loss of one of its few key allies in the Arab world.
Accordingly, from Iran’s perspective, it is the party under threat in Syria. This view became entrenched among Iranian elites at the beginning of the Syrian conflict, as Iran was placed on the defensive and the probability of Assad surviving the protests seemed dim.
Indeed, Iran’s government believed the uprising against Assad was a foreign conspiracy designed to undermine Iran — a direct threat leading some to even claim that “if we lose Syria, we will not be able to preserve Tehran.”
Iran’s entrance in the war was therefore meant to shore up support for its struggling partner and attempt to cut its losses by strengthening local allied militias within Syria with an eye to post-Assad territorial fragmentation — a rational and limited contingency plan in case Assad fell that has been incorrectly interpreted as Iranian expansionism.
From Tehran’s perspective, Israeli strikes against positions linked to Iran and its allies in Syria, alongside belligerent U.S. and Saudi rhetoric, are aimed at undermining Iran’s uncertain deterrent capability. It is thus important to consider Iranian acts of provocation through the lens of establishing deterrence and of its own red lines vis-à-vis Israel.
Iran has decided that the best way to preserve Syria’s continued prominence in the axis of resistance is to make sure that the Syrian state achieves full control over its territory, especially given the very serious challenges Syria faces from rival armed groups after the demise of the Islamic State.